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Abstract
This study, a case study conducted within an Indonesian local government, seeks to
explore the practice of accountability reporting of Indonesian local government following
the decentralisation reform that occurred in 1999. The reform was intended to be an
antithesis of the practices of the Soeharto regime, under which the accountability system of
local governments had been dominated by the New Order regime. This was possible due to
pressure put on public officials: being submissive to the regime was their only choice, if
they wanted to remain in public office. As a result, public officials, including governors,
mayors and regents were more accountable to the regime (the central government) than to
the public. The accountability reports of local governments, for instance, were not made
available to the public.
The study particularly investigates the practice of local-government accountability
reporting and the role played by local parliament in assessing these reports in the postSoeharto era, during which the socio-political landscape has changed: from an authoritarian
and centralised to a democratic and decentralised country; and from a limited political party
system to a multi-party system. Ontologically, this study argues that accountability
reporting is a socially-constructed reality, as individuals involved in the preparation of
accountability reports bring their respective habits, and over time the process becomes an
organisational routine. This study draws on institutional theory as a main theoretical lens,
and power and leadership theories as complementary ones. The study argues that to secure
legitimacy, the local government employs a two-pronged approach that extends to the
organisational and societal field.
This study found that the local government is now required to submit their
accountability reports to three parties: the central government, the provincial parliament
and the public (the reports are the LPPD, LKPj and ILPPD respectively); previously only
the central government and the local parliament had been regarded as the audiences for the
reports. However, while the public now receives a report (the ILPPD), it contains only a
summary of the report submitted to the central government (LPPD). In addition, the ILPPD
x

is also not made available in a timely way (it can be as late as a full month after the latest
time allowed by the provision).
Furthermore, it is apparent that the practice of accountability reporting as conducted
by local government is socially constructed, because interaction among the members of the
government is shaped by the key actor (the governor, along with his circle), mainly through
social relationships rather than formal ones, and by the key actor’s interests of bolstering
legitimacy and maintaining power. In addition, there is decoupling between what the
relevant regulations set forth and what the local government actually does. Among the three
institutional isomorphisms practised by the local government—coercive, mimetic and
normative— it is evident that the local government is more susceptible to coercive
isomorphism, although it is also influenced to a lesser degree by mimetic and normative
isomorphism.
The study also found that the accountability forum— the forum in which the key
actor (the governor) is supposed to be held accountable by local parliament— is at present a
largely ceremonial and symbolic arrangement held annually to meet the letter (rather than
the intention) of the relevant provisions. It is evident that the accountability forums do not
fully meet the accountability-discharge function that might have been hoped for. This is in
part because the local parliament currently lacks a reliable framework with which to assess
the local government’s accountability report.
In the societal field, this study found that the governor is closely engaged with the
prevailing institutions to obtain public legitimacy. There are at least three such institutions
to which the governor has conformed and through which he has sought legitimacy: paying
attention to religious symbols such as mosques and langgars; attending religious rites; and
being respectful towards and maintaining good relationships with gurus. This is confirmed
by the way the local government is run by the governor: by aligning the local government's
work programs with the prevailing institutions embraced by the society. Discharging public
accountability through being open to scrutiny on the performance of local government has
been less important as a means to achieve legitimacy, and has thus been somewhat
neglected.
xi

This study’s empirical findings suggest: first, that the accountability report for the
public (ILPPD) should be available as a full account not a summarised report, as suggested
by some theorists; second, that the ILPPD should be available in a timely basis, as the
failure to make accountability reports available timely will impair the practice of
democracy (Boyne & Law, 1991); and third, that an accountability forum for the public
should be incorporated into the local-government accountability system along with the
accountability forum in the local parliament, since the absence of such a public forum
undermines Indonesia’s claim to be a democratic country.
This study offers a unique contribution considering its setting, Indonesia, which is a
multi-ethnic, diverse culture with numerous local languages, and the third-largest
democratic country in the world after India and the US. This study also contributes to
knowledge by investigating the practice of accountability reporting in the changing
organisational environment following the fall of the Soeharto regime (1967-1998).
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Statement of the Problem
Indonesia is a newly democratic country after more than three decades under the
centralised and authoritarian Soeharto regime (1967-1998) (Ricklefs, 2001; Vickers, 2005).
Indonesia is now the third-largest democratic country in the world after India and the US
(Anwar, 2010; Eliraz, 2007; Buehler, 2009; MacIntyre & Ramage, 2008).
The shift from an authoritarian and centralised regime to a democratic and
decentralised government system in 1999 may have affected the practice of accountability,
including the accountability system of local governments. During the Soeharto regime
(1967-1998), local-government accountability had been controlled by the regime. This was
possible due to public officials of local governments becoming loyalists of the regime,
instead of serving the public. Not surprisingly, the accountability system of local
government at that time was designed to be more accountable to the regime (the central
government) than to the public. The Soeharto regime’s Law No. 5 (1974) on Local
Government did not consider the public as a party to whom the government should be
accountable, even to the extent of merely keeping them well-informed. For example, the
accountability reports of local governments were not made available to the public.
The change of government system from centralised to decentralised, however, did
not automatically improve the local-government accountability system, including its
accountability reporting. This can be seen from the regulations enacted in the reform era
(post-Soeharto regime). Government Regulation (GR) No. 3 (2007) on Accountability
1
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Reporting of Local Government, for instance, required local governments to submit
separate accountability reports to the central government and local parliament (the LPPD
and the LKPj, respectively), and to make a summarised accountability report (the ILPPD)
available to the public. Thus, the public received limited information, because the ILPPD
was only a summary of the accountability report submitted to the central government
(LPPD). It should be noted that the reports rendered to the central government and made
available to the public were not accompanied by an accountability forum, in which the
actor (governor) would discharge his/her administration’s accountability before relevant
parties, such as citizens. Instead, the accountability forum is only available within the local
parliament.
These phenomena are consistent with the study carried out by Goetz and Jenkins
(2001), and support the notion that there is a lack of public trust in political and
administrative forms of accountability in most developing countries. Specifically, Smoke
(2005) found that even though various forms of public reporting were required, the
transparency of Indonesian local governments was still weak. Studies conducted by DRSP
(2009) and Harun and Kamase (2012) found that Indonesian local governments lack
institutional capacity in preparing their accountability reports. On the legislative side, two
studies conducted by DRSP (2009) and ADB (2004b) revealed that Indonesian local
parliaments had an inadequate capacity in evaluating local-government accountability
reports. Specifically, Green (2005) noted that Indonesian local parliaments do not possess
proper criteria in assessing local-government accountability reports.
The two research questions emerging from this are:
2
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1. How does local government prepare its annual accountability reports?
2. How does local parliament use the accountability forum to evaluate the annual
accountability report submitted by local government?

This study seeks to explore the practice of accountability reporting in Indonesian
local government following the decentralisation reform that occurred in 1999. It also
investigates the role played by local parliament in assessing the report since the dramatic
changes in the socio-political landscape in the post-Soeharto era: from authoritarian and
centralised to democratic and decentralised; and from a limited political party system to a
multi-party system.

1.2. Significance of the Study
This study is worth investigating for three reasons:
First, accountability is a salient feature of democracy, as demonstrated by Romzek
and Dubnick (1987), Boyne and Law (1991), Aucoin and Heintzman (2000), and
Castiglione (2007). In Indonesian context, although the country has been embracing the
democratic system for more than one decade since the fall of Soeharto regime in 1998, the
practice of accountability reporting is still far from ideal. In terms of local-government
accountability reporting, for instance, the public has not yet been regarded as an important
and appropriate audience. This is demonstrated by the public only being able to access a
summarised accountability report (ILLPD) of the accountability report submitting to the
central government (LPPD). This was possible due to Government Regulation No. 3 (2007)
3
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tending to “protect” government’s interests, instead of the peoples’ rights to information.
The practice contradicts the principle of democracy that enshrines the public’s right to
information (Castiglione, 2007).
Second, accountability reports play a major role as a medium of accountability
discharge in the public sector (Boyne & Law 1991; Sinclair, 1995; Coy & Pratt, 1998;
Taylor & Rosair, 2000). In the case of Indonesian local governments, this role has not yet
developed, as the transparency of Indonesian local government is still embryonic (see
Harun et al., 2012; DRSP, 2009; Smoke, 2005). This happens as the ruling elites seem
reluctant to implement a wholehearted reform, as transparency can potentially ‘disrupt’ the
“games” (transactional politics) they usually play (Harun, 2007). The practice further
brings an unintended consequence, in which the absence of administrative transparency has
led to accountability not serving as a control mechanism to prevent public officials’ abuse
of power as suggested by Aucoin and Heintzman (2000).
Third, accountability reporting also serves as an input for parliamentary scrutiny
(Milazzo, 1992; Mulgan, 2001; Hughes, 2003; Bovens, 2007a; Rahman, 2008). Studies
carried out by Harun et al. (2012), DRSP (2009) Harun (2007) and Green (2005) found that
Indonesian local parliaments suffered institutional incapacity in evaluating localgovernment accountability reports. DRSP (2009) noted that even if a procedure about how
to assess the reports existed, the parliaments do not possess it; let alone any sophisticated
evaluation tools. This phenomenon has undermined the function of parliament in
overseeing the executive; as a result the checks and balances mechanism cannot run
properly as suggested by Bovens (2007a) and Mulgan (2000a).
4
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Therefore, it is important to conduct research into accountability reporting. This
study will fill a gap in the body of knowledge, in which there are still limited studies
concerning the practice of the accountability reporting of local governments within
developing countries, particularly in Indonesia.

1.3. The Aims and Scope of the Research
This study has two objectives: first, to understand the practice of accountability
reporting as exercised by the Indonesian local governments following the decentralisation
reform; and second, to understand the practice of the accountability forum, through which
the power holders discharge their administrative accountability. Hence, the end product of
this study will provide evaluation and feedback for the central government, local
government, local parliament, non-governmental organisation, the press and other
stakeholders so that the practice of local-government accountability reporting can be
enhanced.
The scope of the research needs to be set explicitly to help me remain focused on
the objectives of this study. In addition, accountability is a complex and multi-faceted
concept (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Stone, 1995; Sinclair, 1995; Bovens, 2007a; Erkkilä,
2007). Table 1.1 demonstrates the various dimensions of an accountability system.

5
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Table 1.1. The multi-dimensions of an accountability system
Dimensions of
Accountability
System
1. Bureaucratic
2. Legal
3. Professional
4. Political
5. Market
6. Personal
7. Public
8. Managerial
9. Performance
10. Administrative

Romzek and
Dubnick
(1987)
√
√
√
√
–
–
–
–
–
–

Stone (1995)

Sinclair
(1995)

Bovens
(2007a)

Erkkilä
(2007)

–
√
–
√
√
–
√
√
–
–

–
–
√
√
–
√
√
√
–
–

–
√
√
√
–
–
√
–
–
√

√
–
√
√
–
√
√
–
√
–

Table 1.1 indicates that the scholars above agree to include political accountability
as being one dimension constituting an accountability system. This is not the case for other
dimensions; it could mean that political accountability is one of the most important
dimensions of an accountability system. One of the features of political accountability is to
require the public office holder to be accountable to elected representatives (Stone, 1995;
Mulgan, 2000a; Bovens, 2007a;). In the Indonesian context, during the Soeharto regime
(1967-1998), local parliaments suffered institutional capacity limitations in holding the
executives to being accountable, as the parliaments were under the shadow of the regime.
However, in the post-Soeharto era this situation persists; because of self-interest behaviour
of the members of parliaments—one of the legacies left by the Soeharto regime— drives
them to be busy with their own personal wishes instead of boosting parliaments’
institutional capacity (Bünte & Ufen, 2009; DRSP, 2009).
This study will look at the practice of the political accountability system of
Indonesian local government. Specifically, the study will investigate the practice of local6
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government accountability reporting from its preparation to the rendering of the report
before members of local parliament. By focusing on such issues, this study can provide
insights with regard to the practice of local governments’ accountability reporting in the
post-Soeharto (reform) era; not only on the side of executive, but also on the legislative
side.
The accountability reporting of Indonesian local governments is somewhat complex
because there are various forms of accountability reports (Solikin, 2006). At the time of
data collection, there were five types of accountability reports required by the provision to
the local governments:
•

financial reports (LKPD);

•

performance reports (LAKIP); and

•

three accountability reports under Law No. 32 (2004) and Government Regulation
No. 3 (2007): the LPPD (submitted to the central government); the LKPj (rendered
to local parliament) and the ILPPD (available to the public).
This study will focus on these last three accountability reports (LPPD, LKPj and

ILPPD), as little or no research has been conducted in this area. Research on financial
reports (LKPD) was conducted by Harun and Kamase (2012) and Martani and Liestiani
(2010), while Akbar et al. (2012) investigated local governments’ performance reports
(LAKIP). Furthermore, according to Government Regulation No. 3 (2007) the LPPD, LKPj
and ILPPD should report on several local-governments aspects such as finances, procedures
and products. This is line with the work of Coy et al. (2001), which suggests those aspects
should be included in the accountability reports.
7
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In conclusion, the scope of this study is to look at the practice of a politicalaccountability system in Indonesian local government. Specifically, this study will
investigate the practice of local-government accountability reporting from preparation to
submission to local parliament.

1.4. Contributions of the Thesis
Contributions of this study encompass several perspectives: research method,
research-setting, accountability theory and theoretical lens.
From a research-method standpoint, this study uses a case-study research strategy to
contribute to the body of literature on accountability in the public sector, particularly on the
practice of accountability reporting in a developing country. The majority of studies
relating to accountability reporting in the public sector have been conducted in developed
countries using surveys. Likewise, developed countries have been the context for research
on accountability using the case-study approach. There is quite limited research relating to
accountability reporting in developing countries, particularly in Indonesia. Although casestudy research has inherent limitations, as it cannot offer generalisable conclusions as
suggested by Tellis (1997a) and Dul and Hak (2008), the contribution of this study gain
benefits from employing this strategy. In terms of organisational culture of local
government, for instance, this can be well-comprehended through this research strategy.
This was possible because case-study research strategy drives researchers to enhance their
“understanding of both the day-to-day organizational complexities of such practices and the
interrelated influence of wider social and political contexts” (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996,
8
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p.94). Thus, the use of this research strategy for future research conducted in
institutionalised environment can be recommended.
This study offers a unique contribution, considering its setting, Indonesia, which is a
multi-ethnic, diverse culture with numerous local languages, and the third-largest
democratic country in the world after India and the United States. Concerning language
proficiency, for instance, this study corroborates the work of Scapens (2004) that
highlighted the importance of a highly-proficient language skill in the researchers
conducting case-study research, including local language skills where the research is
conducted. On-site experience has yielded an insight into context that required excellent
local language skill in order to access the object being studied, interview and capture the
nuances expressed by the informants. By delivering a case-study from an emerging and
newly democratic country, this study responds to the call made by Hoopwod (1976; 1983)
that accounting should be investigated where it operates and through which the uniqueness
of this study can contribute to the body of knowledge.
This study also contributes to accountability theory, particularly public sector
accountability theory, particularly in developing country, by investigating the practice of
accountability reporting in the changing organisational environment following the fall of
the Soeharto regime (1967-1998). The findings of this study revealed that the change of
government system from centralised to decentralised, however, did not automatically
improve the local-government accountability system. The local-government accountability
forum held by the provincial parliament, for instance, was not a stark contrast with that of
the forum in the Soeharto era. Theoretically, the accountability forum is a forum in which
9
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the power-holder is obliged to explain and justify his or her conduct, a question-and-answer
session is scheduled, and recommendations resulting from the forum have the potential to
trigger the imposition of sanctions on the power-holder, as suggested by theorists such as
Bovens (2007a, 2007b, 2010) and Mulgan (2000a). Regrettably, those elements of
accountability did not exist in the post-Soeharto forum. The insight that can be drawn from
this finding is that superficial adoption of the accountability concept taken by the
government of Indonesia merely results in a formal procedure and ceremonial arrangement.
From a theoretical-lens viewpoint, the findings of this study offer an insight that
institutional theory can guide me, as a social researcher, in identifying the key actors
involved in the practice of local-government accountability reporting. The theory not only
can “detect” the key actors within organisation under study, but also the influential actors in
the societal field. In the case of South Kalimantan province, it has been a long-standing
institution that the people pay great respect to the local gurus (religious leaders), because
they are commonly perceived as having a special relationship with God. Given this
institution, the ruling elites in the province also pay great respect to, and foster good and
close relationship with, gurus, particularly those having large followings. Further, the elites
also support traditional religious rites or events conducted by gurus and the society by
allocating funds from the provincial budget for religious events. In doing so, the elites can
be perceived by the public as sharing similar values with the larger society, and thereby are
much more likely to obtain organisational legitimacy, one of the essential concepts of
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
In this sense, institutional theory as a theoretical lens is potent in mapping, linking,
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capturing the key and influential actors involved in the practice of local-government
accountability reporting. Thus, the use of institutional theory can convey a holistic and rich
understanding of issues within this socio-cultural setting.

1.5. A Brief Research Methodology
It is advisable to determine a research methodology before further stage of research
is conducted, as suggested by Bisman (2010). The choice of a consistent ontological and
epistemological assumption can guide the researcher in choosing a paradigm and theory for
the study (Gaffikin 2008, Bisman, 2010).
Gaffikin (2008) classified ontological assumptions into two categories: realist and
non-realist ontology. Realist ontology perceives that the world exists independently from
its human observers, while non-realist ontology believes that objects around us are socially
constructed. In examining non-realist ontology, Creswell (1998) stated that reality is
constructed by individuals engaged in the social environment of the community. This study
perceives that accountability reports are socially constructed by the actors to obtain
legitimacy and maintain power. According to Guba and Lincoln (1988, cited in Creswell,
1998, p. 76), an epistemological assumption of qualitative research requires the researcher
to lessen the distance of the researcher from the object being studied. Therefore, the
researcher is required to choose an appropriate research strategy. Consistent with its
ontological and epistemological assumptions, this study employs an interpretive paradigm.
Neuman (2006, p. 88) defined the interpretive paradigm as “systematic analysis of socially
meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural setting in
11
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order to arrive at understanding and interpretation of how people create and maintain their
social worlds”.
Yin (2003) stated that there are some conditions to be met in choosing a research
strategy, such as the type of research questions, the researcher’s control over the situation
or object being studied, and whether or not the study focuses on contemporary events.
Furthermore, Yin (2003) explained that the case study is an appropriate strategy if it meets
three factors: (a) “how” or “why” questions are being proposed, (b) the researcher has
insignificant control over events, and (c) the focus of the study is contemporary events.
Based on these arguments, this study uses a case-study approach as the most appropriate
research strategy. A single-case study will be conducted to investigate the practice of local
government’s accountability reporting in Indonesia.
This study was conducted in the South Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG),
Indonesia. The reasons for choosing the SKPG as the object of this study were based on the
following arguments (a) I was given permission to conduct research on the practice of
accountability reporting within the SKPG; and (b) I am a native of South Kalimantan and
therefore have an advantage that allows me to explore more of the socio-cultural life of
South Kalimantan society by using the local language. As noted earlier, Scapens (2004)
emphasized the high proficiency of language skill needed in researchers who undertake
case-study research, including knowledge of the local language where research is
conducted; through which I can sense, distinguish and interpret the perception, expression,
behaviour and emotions of my Informants, as suggested by Mason (2002) and then extract
meanings from these with some proficiency.
12
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In collecting data, the study used direct observation, interviews and documentation.
Data was collected by observing the site for six months. To get a better understanding,
open-ended interviews were carried out with key persons or informants within the SKPG
office. This study also involved attendance at a provincial parliament meeting in which the
governor of the South Kalimantan Provincial Government rendered his administration’s
accountability report to the members of the South Kalimantan Provincial Parliament.

1.6. Organisation of the Thesis
This study is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 1 offers an overall introduction
to the thesis, including the statement of the problem and research questions, the
significance of the study, the aims and scope of the research and the contribution to
research. Chapter 2 provides a critical review of accountability in the public sector and its
reporting system. Chapter 3 presents a brief history of Indonesia and the legacies of the
Soeharto regime. These legacies might have shaped the practice of accountability of local
governments, as the Soeharto regime was the longest-ruling of the post-colonial era.
Chapter 4 describes the environmental setting, organisational culture and structure of the
South Kalimantan Provincial Government, the local government selected by this study.
Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the theoretical framework of this study. Institutional
theory is adopted as the main theoretical lens to analyse the research findings. Chapter 6
discusses the philosophical foundations of the research (ontology, epistemology,
methodology and method) and the research approach employed by this study. Chapter 7
presents on-site accounts and empirical findings, and discusses them using institutional
13
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theory combined with power theory. Chapter 8 describes and discusses the accountability
forums held by the local parliament, in which the key actor, the governor, discharges his
administration's accountability before the members of the provincial parliament. Chapter 9
presents the concluding remarks of this study and potential further research.
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2.1. Introduction
This chapter presents a literature review of accountability in the public sector and its
reporting system; this literature review informs a discussion of the meaning of
accountability and the studies done in this area, and establishes the need for this study on
accountability reporting in Indonesian local government. The rest of the chapter is
organised into 7 sections: the concept of accountability (section 2.2); definitions of
accountability (section 2.3); the accountability framework in the public sector (section 2.4);
accountability: some critiques (section 2.5); the annual report as medium of accountability
(section 2.6); the local-government accountability system in Indonesian context (section
2.7); and a conclusion (section 2.8).

2.2. The Concept of Accountability
Accountability is a longstanding concept, dating back to around 2000 BC, when
King Hammurabi of the Babylonian Kingdom promulgated a legal code for the empire
(Bird, 1973, cited in Velayutham & Perera, 2004). According to Dubnick (2002), King
William I of England applied the concept of accountability starting from the Norman
invasion in 1066, as indicated by the obligation to report on all properties in the territory;
these reports were recorded in the Domesday Book. Dubnick (2002) believed William I’s
regime was the pioneer in founding the concept of accountability for governance, arguing
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that William I was known to have a good administration in which all assets under his
sovereignty were recorded using simple accounting records.
Harlow (2002) shared view raised by Dubnick (2002) and noted that in the
beginning accountability had mainly focused on financial accounting, until a change in the
early 1980s shifted the focus from financial accounting-based accountability to a broader
concept of overall responsibility to the public (cited in Bovens 2005a).
Following the spread of democracy worldwide, accountability is a popular word in
countries embracing democratic systems, but it is also a somewhat ambiguous notion
(Levaggi, 1995; Sinclair, 1995; Blagescu et al, 2005; Bovens, 2007a). This situation has led
to the scholars developing their own conception of accountability (see Williams, 1987;
O’Connell, 2005; Koppell, 2005; Mulgan, 2000a; Bovens, 2010).
Williams (1987) notes that accountability is closely associated with fairness and
ethics: in evaluating the submitted account, the account holder may treat it as being either
fair or unfair. Williams also suggests that the account holder should take an impartial
position in assessing the account. Williams thus relates accountability to the good conduct
of the actors involved in the accountability process and this idea is also concurred by
Messner (2009).
O’Connell (2005) extended the attributes of accountability from just the quality of
the actor’s behaviour to encompass technical issues, asserting that accountability in public
agencies has to do with high-quality services and cost-efficiency delivered with good
behaviour. In order to control the behaviour of the public-office holders keep accountable,
Koppell (2005) suggested that controllability should be included in accountability system.
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On the other hand, Mulgan (2000a) stated that the central notion of accountability is
“being called to account for one’s actions.” This means that there is an external party
scrutinising one’s compliance with the mandate that has been given. In a similar vein,
Patton (1992) highlighted the role of the account-holder (external party) in assessing the
account submitted by the accountor, as the account-holder has the legitimate right to do so,
like parliaments (Stone, 1995; Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). This assessment allows the
checks and balances mechanism can function properly (Rahman, 2008).
Why do scholars propose different concepts of accountability? Mulgan (2001)
argued that accountability is a situational concept, in that its arrangement depends on the
particular context where the accountability operates. Sinclair (1995) added that these
differences take place because accountability has a multi-discipline meaning. Sinclair then
provided some instances: auditors view accountability from financial and numerical
perspectives, while political researchers look at accountability from a political-science
perspective. Legal experts approach accountability from a legal viewpoint, while
philosophers stress the ethics of actors’ behaviour. Thus, the concept of accountability is
contested and contestable among scholars (Sinclair, 1995; Mulgan, 2000a).
Bovens (2010) mapped the discourse of the accountability concept into two schools.
The first school, embraced by most American scholars, perceives accountability as a set of
standards used in assessing the conduct or behaviour of public officials, based on the
righteousness or virtue of the actors (Bovens, 2010). In other words, “being accountable is
seen as a virtue, as a positive quality of organizations or officials” (Bovens, 2010). The
second school, to which many European, Australian and Canadian scholars belong, views
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“accountability as a societal arrangement and institutional relationship through which the
mandate-recipient can be held accountable by the mandate-giver” (Bovens, 2010).
Scholars have proposed various concepts of accountability, can be grouped into two
schools: accountability as a virtue (that is, as a result of the good behaviour of the actors),
and accountability as a mechanism through which the holders of public office can be held
accountable for their official actions.

2.3. Definitions of Accountability
This section presents some definitions of accountability that exist in the body of
literature and selects a definition appropriate for the purpose of this study.
Some scholars, such as Roberts (1991), Williams (1987), O’Connell (2005) and
Messner (2009), viewed accountability as a virtue. Roberts (1991, p. 356), for instance,
defined accountability as:
A form of social relation which reflects symbolically upon the practical
interdependence of action: an interdependence that always has both a moral and
strategic dimension.

Messner (2009, p. 920) defined accountability as:
a morally significant practice, since to demand an account from someone is to ask
this person to enact discursively the responsibility of her behavior.

These definitions offer a reflection that accountability serves as a moral compass in
which the public-office holders can behave in an ethical way in running their
administrations. This is in line with the claim made by Friedrich (1940 cited in Romzek,
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1996) that modern bureaucracy is able to refrain from doing unacceptable behaviour, as it
has a self-control mechanism. Sinclair (1995, p. 231), however, found that accountability as
a virtue (personal accountability) such as honesty is somewhat difficult; as it is “more
‘idiosyncratic’, the product of an upbringing or personal voyage of discovery…”
Others scholars have constructed the definition from the perspective of
accountability as a mechanism. Jones (1992), Jackson (1982), Thynne and Goldring (1987),
Kluvers (2003), Gray and Jenkins (1986), Mulgan (2000a) and Bovens (2007a) are some
major proponents of this school.
Jones (1992) defined accountability as “the process of being called to account to
some authority for one’s actions” (cited in Mulgan 2000a, p. 555). This definition
emphasises that accountability is a process within certain arrangements for giving account.
Jackson (1982, cited in Levaggi, 1995, p.287) defined accountability by saying:
Basically, accountability involves explaining or justifying what has been done, what
is currently being done and what has been planned. Accountability arises from a
set of established procedures, and relationship of varying formality. Thus, one part
is upon the other to give an account of his activities. Accountability therefore
involves the giving of information.

This definition implies that what has been done by the accountor should be presented in a
comparable form. This allows the account holder to make a comparison between what had
been targeted beforehand and what has been achieved by the accountor.
In similar vein, Thynne and Goldring (1987) defined accountability as follows:
…in the context of a relationship with an institution or person which or who is in a
position to enforce their responsibility by calling them to account for what they (and
or their subordinate) have and have not done…subject to an institution’s or a
person’s oversight direction or request that they provide information on their action
or justify it before a review authority (cited in Sinclair, 1995, p. 221).
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Thynne and Goldring’s definition suggests that the accountor not only reports what has
been done but also reveals what has not been done. Kluvers (2003) noted that government
agencies sometimes, if not often, hide what has not been done, to protect their image. As a
result, asymmetric information transfer inevitably takes place, and the public, far from the
process of decision-making, hardly knows what is happening.
Mulgan (2000a) defined accountability by saying that “the core of accountability is
the obligation to answer to a superior for one’s actions and to accept appropriate remedies
including sanctions.” This view is also shared by Gray and Jenkins (1986) who defined
accountability as a compulsory action to render an account of the conduct of the steward to
the principal.
Mulgan (2000a) explained that his definition implied a number of characteristics.
First, there is the presence of external control, in which the account is submitted to other
parties outside the entity. Bovens (2007a, 2010) and Rahman (2008) concurred this idea, as
it will generate checks and balances in the accountability system. Second, there is a social
interaction and the availability of dialogue in which the account-holder has the right to pose
the questions, on the one hand, and the accountor has the obligation to respond by giving
answers, explanations and justification, on the other hand. Pollitt (2003, p. 84) wrote:
A strong system of democratic accountability allows citizens to see how far the
political leadership has responded to their interests – what they have done with the
authority and resources with which they have been entrusted.

Third, there is the right of authority, in which the account-holder can suggest
improvements and even sanctions, and those being called to account have to accept them.
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Patton (1992) noted sanction or reward is the feature of accountability; accountability can
be said does not exist, if this feature is absence in the accountability system.
Bovens (2007a, p.450) defined accountability based on the origin of the word itself
and its historical perspective:
Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor
has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences.

Bovens (2007a, p. 452) then identified seven elements constituting accountability:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

There is a relationship between an actor and forum
In which the actor is obliged
To explain and justify
His [or her] conduct
The forum can pose questions
Pass judgment
And the actor may face consequences

Bovens (2010) maintained that defining accountability as a virtue is very difficult,
since “there is no general consensus about the standards for accountable behaviour, and
because these standards differ, depending on role, institutional context, era, and political
perspective” (Bovens, 2010, p. 949).
Bovens (2010) further explained that the standard for accountable conduct or
behaviour of elected politicians, for instance, is significantly different to the standards for
government employees in nearly all European parliaments. Elected politicians have to be
responsible to the legislative body, citizens, press and other stakeholders, while public
servants should be loyal to the elected politicians who appointed them. The various
definitions of accountability exist because they are influenced and shaped by social,
cultural and political contexts (Cochrane, 1993; Ogden, 1995, Ezzamel et al., 2007).
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Considering Indonesia’s social, cultural and political contexts (discussed in Chapter
Three), this study employs the definition of accountability as a mechanism. This does not
mean that accountability as a virtue is less important or less valuable. Rather, this study
focuses more on the mechanism of accountability systems of local government in the
reform era. During the Soeharto regime (1967-1998), the mechanism of local-government
accountability was silenced by the regime. For instance, local parliaments did not perform
their control and oversight tasks properly. This was possible because most of the members
of local parliaments across the country were controlled by the regime. As a result, they
served as the representatives of the regime rather than of the people. Employing the
definition of accountability as a mechanism can shed light on the practice of political
accountability in the post-Soeharto (reform) era, as this definition provides tangible
elements of accountability as noted by Bovens (2007a). Specifically, following the fall of
the Soeharto regime, the socio-political setting has substantially changed: the public has
been acknowledged as a party to whom accountability reports should be rendered along
with the central government and local parliaments; legislatures are no longer dominated by
a single political party (the Soeharto regime-sponsored Golkar); and the freedom of the
press is protected by law.
Having reviewed various definitions, this study employs a definition of
accountability established by Bovens (2007a, p. 450):
A relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to
explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass
judgement and the actor may face consequences.
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2.4. Accountability Framework in the Public Sector
This section describes the accountability framework in the public sector in three subsections: public-organisation characteristics; accounting and myth in the public sector; and
accountability framework.
2.4.1. Public-Organisation Characteristics
An organisation can be defined as a group of people who work together in a
systematic way to pursue a common objective (Rainey, 2009; Schermerhorn, Jr. et al.,
2010). Generally, organisations can be categorised into three sectors: public (usually
government), private (business entities) and the third sector— not-for-profit organisations
such as charities (Nutt, 2000). The next sub-section describes the characteristics of the
public-sector organisation.
Much attention has been paid to the debate on similarities and differences between
public and private organisations (see Galbraith, 1973; Murray, 1975; Rainey et al., 1976;
Bozeman, 1987; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Nutt & Backoff, 1993; Rainey &
Bozeman, 2000; Martin & Parker, 1997; Nutt, 2000; Boyne, 2002; Christensen et al.,
2007). Galbraith (1973), for instance, noted that many private organisations strongly
controlled markets in the public sphere, giving them a power similar to that of public
organisations (cited in Rainey et al., 1976). Furthermore, Bozeman (1987, p. xi) asserted
that “all organizations are public”, since each organisation, both public and private, has an
attribute of “publicness”— “the degree to which organisation is affected by political
authority”. However, Nutt and Backoff (1993) contended that the extent to which political
aspects influence both types of organisations is different: political authority affects private
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organisations indirectly, while public organisations are directly overseen by political forces
(parliaments). This view is also shared by Martin and Parker (1997). Table (2.1)
summarises the distinctions between public and private organisation based on the works of
Martin and Parker (1997), Nutt and Backoff (1993) and Nutt (2000).
Table 2.1. Distinctions between Public and Private Organisations
Features

Public Organisation

Goals

Multiple and sometimes vague
and
conflicting
(public
interests), focus on input, nonmarket prices
Labour
High security of employment
Accounting and management Under-developed
information system
Nature of the business
Politically and geographically
constrained

Data availability
Constraints

Data often limited
Mandates and obligations limit
autonomy and flexibility

Ownership

Citizens often act as owners and
impose their expectations about
organizations’ activities and the
conduct of these activities

Private Organisation
Uni-dimensional (profit), focus
on outputs/outcomes, market
prices
Less security of employment
Strong accounting and MIS
Commercially
determined,
diversification, investment and
disinvestment/merger/overseas
ventures
Data typically available
Autonomy and flexibility limited
only by law and the need for
internal consensus
Ownership vested in stockholders
whose interests are interpreted
using financial indicators

Adapted from Nutt & Backoff (1993, p. 211), Martin & Parker (1997, p. 178) and Nutt (2000, p.80)

Apart from these features, there are other characteristics of public organisations in
developing countries, particularly Indonesia, such as inefficiency, low institutional capacity
and high levels of informality. Some studies noted that Indonesian local governments suffer
administrative efficiencies (DRSP, 2006; DRSP, 2009; ADB, 2004a; White & Smoke,
2005; Buehler, 2012). Further, the phenomenon of low institutional capacity is common in
developing countries (Graham, 2002; Smoke, 2005). Some studies found that Indonesian
local governments had limited institutional capacity in carrying out their duties
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(Imbarrudin, 2004; DRSP, 2009; Harun & Kamase, 2012). Informality has been the norm
in many public organisations (Rainey, 2009; Ongaro, 2009), particularly in developing
countries (World Bank, 1997; Shah & Shah, 2006). According to Giddens (2009),
informality does not always bring a negative impact, as informal tie to some extent can
provide a breakthrough to members of organisation in conducting formal procedures.
However, the practice of informality in developing countries is different, as suggested by
Giddens (2009): it not only breaches formal procedures, but also overlaps their authority
(World Bank, 1997).
2.4.2. Accounting and Myth in the Public Organisations
The seminal work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) revealed that organisations employ
their organisational structures (including institutionalised products, policies, programs and
techniques) merely as myth and as ceremony that are intended to portray the organisation as
conforming to prevailing institutions to gain legitimacy. This is supported by a study by
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) which found that many local governments had adopted a meritbased system for their civil-service reform because the merit system had been widelyacknowledged for improving civil services; in other words, organisations tend to copy the
other organisations’ success. Modell (2004, p.40) offers a definition of myth as “more and
less institutionalised, or taken-for-granted images of organizations and thus serve an
important role as sense-making device”. Christensen et al. (2007, p.57) defined myth as
“socially-created norms in institutional environments”. Leaders of public organisations, for
instance, have claimed that their organisation adopted organisational reforms for the sake of
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the people’s interests in return for boosting their legitimacy; while in reality the changes
they implemented were only superficial reforms (Christensen et al., 2007).
In relation to accounting practice, Martin and Parker (1997) notes that the
development of accounting and management information systems within public
organisations lags behind that in private organisations. This factor might have prompted
public organisations to adopt private sector-inspired accounting technology such as accrualbased accounting, as a manifestation of the myth perspective intended to help them to be
perceived as “modern” organisations (Christensen et al., 2007). As a result, the practice of
accounting within organisation serves as a rationalised myth as suggested by several
authors (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weber, 1978; Meyer, 1986; Carruthers & Espeland,
1991). Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 344), for instance, write that:
…technologies are institutionalized and become myths binding on organizations.
Technical procedures of production, accounting, personnel selection, or data
processing become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational ends.
Quite apart from their possible efficiency, such institutionalized techniques
establish an organization as appropriate, rational, and modern. Their use displays
responsibility and avoids claims of negligence.

In this sense, accounting practice in public sector organisations serve as “window
dressing” (Mouritsen, 1994; Christensen et al., 2007) or “legitimating myth” (Carruthers &
Espeland, 1991), for signalling to their environment that organisations have operated in
accordance with prevailing institutions. Some scholars have criticised this practice, in
which accounting has served as a symbol of rational measures rather as a genuine
achievement of efficiency and effective purposes (see Scapens, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; and
Covaleski et al., 1996).
26

Chapter Two

2.4.3. Accountability Framework
Accountability in the public sector closely relates to three basic questions: (1) who
is accountable? (2) for what are they accountable? and (3) to whom are they accountable?
(Patton, 1992; Mulgan, 2001; Hughes, 2003; Bovens, 2007a, Castiglione, 2007). Bovens
(2007a) extends the questions by asking: why does the actor feel obliged to submit an
account?
Who is accountable? The actor could be an organisation or officials within an
organisation (Mulgan, 2001; Bovens, 2007a; Castiglione, 2007; Hughes, 2003). However,
Bovens (2007a) then asks, due to accountability practices involving many hands, who will
deliver the account in the accountability forum? Mulgan (2001) notes that at the top
organisational level, the leader, on behalf of the organisation, should attend the forum to
deliver the account, while at the individual level, each public servant, company employee
or volunteer should render an account to their superior. However, public organisations
usually consist of many people, at different echelons (Bovens, 2007a; Hughes, 2003). In
policy-making, for instance, certain procedures and layers should be passed through,
involving a number of individual staff as well as task forces or committees reviewing
policy before its implementation (Bovens, 2007a). The question becomes “Who, then,
should be singled out for accountability, blame and punishment?” (Bovens, 2007a, p. 458).
In the case of public-sector accountability, “one for all” arrangement (hierarchical
accountability)–the process of accountability starts with the greatest responsibility at the
highest level, and continues with decreasing degrees of responsibility to the lowest level
(Bovens, 2007a) – seems to be appropriate to apply in this sector. Top-ranking officials are
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held accountable to external parties, while lower ones are accountable to their superiors
(Castiglione, 2007; Bovens, 2007a)
What are they accountable for? Mulgan (2001) maintained that there are three areas
for which organisations or individuals are held accountable: legal compliance and financial
reporting, general direction and performance (particularly in response to public
expectations when the organisation is a public-sector enterprise), and particular clients and
members. In the case public-sector accountability, Castiglione (2007) suggested that it
should look, for instance, the relationship between the actions taken by the public-office
holders and what has been outlined or decisions made by the parliament. Bovens (2007a)
shared the idea proposed by Castiglione (2007) that the precise nature of each actor’s
accountability depends on the kind of forum. From the perspective of legal accountability,
for example, actors should be accountable for their conduct relative to existing laws and
other regulations in the forum of the court. With regard to financial accountability, actors
should be accountable before the forum of an audit by complying with established financial
standards.
To whom are they accountable? Mulgan (2001) claimed that the account has to
encompass three kinds of stakeholders. First, public organisations and their officials can be
held accountable in their legal conformity and financial reporting to the court, to the
Auditor-General’s office and to the public. Second, they can be held accountable in their
general direction and performance to the public, the Auditor-General’s office and the
Ombudsman. Bovens (2007a, pp. 455-456) maintained that because of the various
stakeholders who need to be informed in a democratic country, there are at least five types
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of accountability forums: political accountability to citizens, elected representatives,
ministers and public officials; legal accountability to the courts; administrative
accountability to auditors, inspectors and controllers; professional accountability to
professional peers; social accountability to interest groups, charities and other stakeholders.
The idea to extend the number of account-holders as proposed by Bovens (2007a) allows a
greater coverage of the public-office holders’ accounts to reach various stakeholders as
suggested by Pollitt (2003) and Castiglione (2007).
Why does the actor feel obliged to submit an account? Bovens (2007a) stated that
there are three sorts of accountability: vertical, horizontal and diagonal. Vertical
accountability, for instance, relates to the forum having significant authority to impose
sanctions on an actor. In this kind of accountability, the relationship between the accountor
and accountee is based on a principal-agent relationship, in which the agent feels compelled
to render his or her account. Castiglione (2007) noted in case there is not accountability
forum exerting its external control, the public-office holders should possess the quality of
being responsible to mandate entrusted by citizens. This can drive them to be more
determinant in running their administration Castiglione (2007) and does not feel forced to
report what they have been done to the public.

2.5. Accountability: Some Critiques
Accountability is not a concept without criticism: according to some scholars it has
shortcomings. Bovens (2010) asserted that some politicians have used accountability term
merely as a political jargon. Former US President George Bush, for instance, used the word
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“accountability” as a political mantra in condemning the executives of Enron and
WorldCom for their financial crimes (Dubnick, 2002). This was possible because the term
of accountability has “a power” and symbolism that can bolster the image of its user
(Dubnick, 2002).
Koppell (2005) found that accountability has various meanings: some scholars
equated it with transparency, others with control. Koppell (2005) further stated that in some
academic articles, accountability was defined as having to do with adherence to the law, in
others as responsiveness. Koppell (2005) then opined that the absence of specific definition
of accountability could weaken an organisation’s performance if different actors had
different conceptions of its meaning, or if the organisation confusingly attempted to satisfy
every definition at once. However, arriving to general consensus on a single or more
specific definition of accountability seems to be impossible, as the definition is subject to
ideologies, motifs and languages (Sinclair, 1995) and particular context (Mulgan, 2001).
Kelly (2007) argued that accountability for performance can constitute a trap in
which the [public] employee is more likely to adhere to organisation’s standards rather than
to serve the [citizens or] clients. In pursuing effectiveness, for instance, the organisation
establishes certain standards for the amount of time spent dealing with each client. If a
given employee can serve the client in that time (or faster), it means that the employee is
accountable. In other words, the employee becomes accountable for his or her performance
“by working for the measures and not for his or her client” (Kelly, 2007). However, Bovens
(2005b, 2007a) argued the public-office holders should serve citizenries well, as they have
mandated the executives to do so. To make sure the executives can meet the expectation of
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the citizens, Bovens (2007a) proposed that agencies or individual public managers are held
accountable in a social accountability forum.
In Indonesian context, during the Soeharto regime of more than three decades
(1960s-1990s), the term “good governance” was extensively used to strengthen the
regime’s legitimacy. Bovens (2010) noted aaccountability is used interchangeably used
with good governance, transparency, equity, responsibility and integrity. However, the term
concealed an unpleasant level of collusions, corruption and nepotism (Tambunan, 2000).
The term accountability was so easy to abuse because it was defined so loosely (Bovens,
2010)
Despite some shortcomings inherent in the accountability concept, its existence
matters in the public sphere, particularly in governance practices. Principally,
accountability is the essential element of democracy (Kluvers, 2003; Skogstad, 2003;
Bovens, 2005b; Markoff, 2005; Hodge, 2009), through which public officials are monitored
and held accountable in order to keep them on the right track in running their
administrations (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; Bovens, 2007a).
Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) noted that accountability serves three functions:
accountability as control; accountability as assurance; and accountability as continous
improvement. However, in Indonesian context, the absence of accountability as a control
made the authoritarian Soeharto regime persisted its power for more than three decades
(1967-1998) (Liddle, 1978; 1985). In relation to the second function, laws and regulations
passed by the regime was not intended to protect people interests, instead the regime’
wishes (Bünte & Ufen, 2009), thus this function did not exist during this era. As a result,
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accountability could not manifest as ‘lifeblood’ in protecting the people’s interests as noted
by Hodge (2009, p. 1).
In terms of accountability as continuous improvement, during the regime was in
power, Indonesia did not take any benefit from this function, as the regime disregarded
critical voices raised by the regime’s opponents and even put the opponents in jail
(Ricklefs, 2001). Indonesia is a resources-rich country including coal, gold, copper and
forest. However this huge advantages did not bring people welfare; forest, for instance, had
been exploited in an unsustainable way (Ricklefs, 2001), leaving deforestation rampant in
the country. Therefore, Indonesia did not take a lesson learned from successful countries in
dealing with public-resources management as suggested by Aucoin and Heintzman (2000)
and Bovens (2007a).

2.6. Annual Report as Medium of Accountability
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the practice of
accountability reporting in local government. Some researchers have conducted their
research in the developed countries such as the US (Simon & Ridley, 1938); the UK
(Butterworth et al., 1989; Boyne & Law, 1991); Spain (Benito et al., 2003); Italy
(Steccolini, 2004); and Australia (Kloot & Martin, 2001, 2007; Ryan et al., 2002; Kluvers;
2003; Mack & Ryan, 2007). Other researchers have carried out their studies in developing
countries such as Bangladesh (Samaratunge et al., 2008); Fiji (Rika et al., 2008); Malaysia
(Khalid, 2008); and Indonesia (Harun, 2007; Martani & Liestiani, 2010; Akbar et al., 2012;
Harun & Kamase, 2012).
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The above studies resulted in mixed results worthy of attention. Simon and Ridley
(1938) and Butterworth et al. (1989) found that local-government reports were less
readable, as statistical data were left without interpretation (Simon and Ridley, 1938).
Butterworth et al. (1989, p.84) even concluded that the local-governments that “local
authorities do not intend their report to be read.” Steccolini (2004) noticed that accounting
reforms were conducted through a bureaucratic approach. This in turn led to the accounting
reform and reporting system merely serving as an administrative procedure rather than an
innovation to address citizens’ expectations.
Dubnick (2005) argued that basically, reporting plays two important roles in an
organisation, particularly in the era of modern management: as an essential element of
scientific management evolution and

as a key connector in the process of planning,

organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. But it seems this was
not the case for the above studies.
A study conducted Ryan et al. (2002) showed a better picture than previous studies.
Conducting a survey of 36 Queensland local governments, the study revealed that the
quality of local governments’ annual accountability reporting showed continuous
improvement during 1997-1999 in general. However, some areas had not been disclosed,
such as corporate governance, remuneration of executive staff, personnel, occupational
health and safety, equal-opportunity policies and performance information.
Rika et al. (2008) found the provincial government under study seem to be less
accountable, as the transparency of the using of public money was questioned. The
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provincial government’s financial statement, for instance, was not rendered in a regular and
well-timed basis (Rika et al., 2008).
Likewise, Harun (2007) noted Indonesia’s public sector reform seems to be
undermined by central government officials, as the implementation of accountability
demands more transparency over what has been done by them. This led them being
reluctant in implementing such a reform. This is consistent with claim made by Christensen
et al. (2007) public organisations’ leaders used political rhetoric to win people’s heart that
they had adopted public-sector reform; in fact they implemented the reform in a ‘cosmetic’
way, just for symbolic display.
In relation to the contents of the accountability reports, Bovens (2007a) asserted that
accountability incorporates several aspects rendered to different stakeholders: financial,
procedural and product. Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) and Kluvers (2003) added it should
also consist of a performance aspect. Coy et al. (2001) shared similar view:
The value of the annual report rests in the provision of a wide range of
summarized, relevant information in a single document, which enable all
stakeholders to obtain a comprehensive understanding of [an organization's]
objectives and performance in financial and non-financial terms. No other single
source of such information is available to all stakeholders on a routine basis.

Therefore, annual reporting should contain financial, procedural, product and
performance aspects. Boyne and Law (1991), asserted that an annual report is a set of
comprehensive information prepared in pursuing accountability to the principal. Similarly,
Ryan et al. (2002) argued that an annual report is a crucial medium of accountability for
governmental organisations.
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Similarly, Wishart (1995, cited in Coy & Pratt, 1998) shared the view that an annual
report is an essential element of accountability, which makes it possible (by providing a set
of information for members of parliament) to pose questions to public officials, and
demand answers from them. Thus, the term “annual report” is commonly equated to the
term “accountability report”
However, Jones (1992) contended that there was a large gap in the development of a
conceptual framework of public-sector reporting, due to the predominance of the
accounting profession and oversight agencies in developing the framework, while other
stakeholders were essentially ignored (Jones, 1992). This might have led to the contents of
the report being complex for laymen which in turn would lower the public’s interest in the
accountability report as suggested by Coy and Pratt (1998).
Some factors such as complexity, timeframe, distribution and accessibility of the
report that could cause a low level of interest from the public. Accountability reports, for
instance, usually employ certain financial and performance standards established by
professional associations such as accountancy, which require specialised knowledge to
understand Coy and Pratt (1998).
Additionally, Boyne and Law (1991) argued that failure to render accountability
reports in a timely way weakens the practice of democracy. Dixon et al. (1991) concurred
asserting that timelines are one important factor determining the quality of the
accountability reports.
Public interest in an annual report can also be affected by its distribution and
accessibility. Priest et al. (1999), having conducted a survey on prospective and real users
35

Chapter Two

of local governments’ annual reports in Western Australia, found that only 50% of
respondents had read the reports; the rest had not, due to the reports’ inaccessibility.
Although annual reporting has some shortcomings, its advantages outweigh its
drawbacks. Likewise, Dubnick (2005), maintained that annual reports not only provide
input for control mechanisms but also deliver transparency at every level of an
organisation. Similarly, Milazzo (1992) claimed that annual reports are important in
supporting a legislative body’s function in controlling government agencies.
As Jones (1992) noted, historically the accounting discipline has significantly
shaped accountability frameworks. However, over time there has been a transformation.
Current accountability frameworks are shaped by inter-disciplinary input, not solely that of
the accounting profession: it is now widely agreed that they should encompass general
direction, legal compliance, financial reporting, products and performance information
relating to the organisation (see Coy et al., 2001; Mulgan, 2001; Bovens, 2007a; Steccolini,
2004; Ryan et al., 2002).

2.7. The Local-Government Accountability System in the Indonesian Context
The local-government accountability system is an umbrella system within which
the accountability reporting system is embedded. Thus, a brief description of the localgovernment accountability system is important in understanding how the system is
practised within the Indonesian context.
This section describes the local-government accountability systems during the prereform and reform eras, and gives an overview of how the system has been exercised by
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several regimes in recent Indonesian history. This section is organised into three subsections: the first presents the practice of local-government accountability systems during
the pre-reform era; the second depicts the practice of the system within the reform era; and
the last describes the accountability forum in its Indonesian context.
2.7.1. Pre-Reform Era
There is limited information concerning accountability systems implemented during
the Dutch colonial era (1596 -1942), but it is known that the colonial ruler exercised an
accounting system called ICW (Indische Compatabiliteitswet). The system was established
in 1864 (Ghozali & Ratmono, 2008) and used a single-entry system (Nasution, 2007).
According to Sugianto et al. (1995), the ICW had at least four shortcomings (cited
in Robinson & Harun, 2004). First, the standard of recording was not well set up, leading to
difficulty in comparing the planned budget with the realised budget. Second, the chart of
accounts was not properly established. Third, the capital and operational expenditures were
not clearly distinguished. Fourth, the ICW was intended to provide financial information
solely for an internal audience: the Dutch colonial government (Sugianto et al., 1995, cited
in Robinson & Harun, 2004).Therefore, it makes sense to say that there was no strong
accountability system in place during the Dutch colonial era, as the ICW was designed to
support the Dutch, instead of being accountable to the people of its colony (Indonesia).
During the Soekarno regime (1945-1967), the local-government accountability
system was set out under Law No. 18 (1965) on Local Government. The law required the
head of the provincial (governor) and district governments (bupati/mayor) to be
accountable to the president only via the minister of home affairs.
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The law did not regard the local parliament (DPRD) and the public as the parties to
whom the heads of local governments should be accountable. This was particularly limiting
to local accountability because the governor and bupati/mayor were appointed by the
president as stipulated by Law No. 18 (1965), instead of being elected by local parliament
or the public. The law was very centralistic; the promotion system for local-government
civil servants, for instance, was also determined by the central government (article 60).
Soeharto then came to power to succeed Soekarno in 1967. Soeharto labelled his
regime as the Orde Baru (the New Order) and called Soekarno regime as Orde Lama (the
Old Order). Soeharto replaced Law No. 18 (1965) on Local Government with Law No. 5
(1974) on Local Government.
However, the new law did not give greater authority to local governments; rather, it
functioned to preserve Soeharto’s (New Order) power. Article 15 of the law, for instance,
stipulated that provincial parliament could only nominate two candidates for governor, with
the president choosing between them.
The Soeharto regime also shrewdly used the term ‘decentralisation’ (desentralisasi)
in Law No. 5 (1974) as a symbolic display to demonstrate to the public that the regime had
devolved some authority local governments without actually doing so. In fact, the Soeharto
regime was not much different from the Soekarno reign in terms of its preference for
centralistic power. The Soeharto rule, for instance, only transferred “the tasks” (or
mechanics) of the central government, while “the discretions” (or policy and decisionmaking) of the tasks still rested on the central government (Abidin, 2001). Law No. 5
(1974) also stated that the governor was accountable to two parties only: the president and
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the provincial parliament (article 22); this left the public disregarded as a proper party to
whom the head of local government should be accountable.
In addition, although the accountability forum— the forum in which the executive
was held accountable— was conducted in the local parliament as stipulated by law No. 5
(1974), it functioned merely as a symbolic display. This was because most of members of
parliaments (nationally and locally) were the regime’s representative instead of the people’s
(Suryadinata, 2007). Thus no penetrating questions or significant disclosures were made
there.
In short, it is apparent that the local-government accountability system did not exist
in a strong form during the Dutch colonial era (1596 -1942). During the Soekarno (19451967) and Soeharto (1967-1998) regimes, these systems were in place, but they were of
limited use as the two regimes had the legal means to preserve their centralised power and
did not allow meaningful local scrutiny.
2.7.2. Reform Era
Following the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, Habibie succeeded Soeharto as
the third Indonesian president. The Habibie administration passed a number of laws,
including Law No. 22 (1999) on Local Government and Law No. 25 (1999) on Fiscal
Decentralisation and Revenues Sharing.
According to Anwar (2010) the emergence of these two laws was the cornerstone
for decentralisation reforms after more than three decades of Indonesia being socially,
politically and economically controlled by the Soeharto regime.

Law No. 25 (1999)
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granted a greater power to local governments to manage their locally-generated revenues,
alongside money transferred in by the central government.
The important feature of Law No. 22 (1999) was to grant a greater authority to local
governments in managing their respective regions, except in five key areas: defence and
security, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary policy, law enforcement and religious affairs
which were still under the central government's authority.
Law No. 22 (1999) required the head of local governments to submit their
accountability reports to two parties: the president and the local parliament. This law
strengthened the role of the accountability forum by granting authority to local parliament
to impose sanction to heads of local parliament, if the latter’s accountability report was
rejected by the parliament.
Following the end of Habibie’s term in office, Indonesia held a presidential election
in the plenary session of the MPR on October 20, 1999. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected
as the fourth Indonesian president (Liddle, 2000). The Wahid administration endorsed
Government Regulation (GR1) No. 108 (2000) on the local-government accountability
system. However, the regulation still did not regard the public as the party to whom the
governors, mayors or regents should be accountable. The regulation only required the head
of local governments to submit their administration accountability reports to two parties:
local parliament and the president (Article 2).

1
Government Regulation (GR), in Indonesian administrative context, will be issued following the passing of
the new law. GR serves as operational guidelines of the law endorsed.
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Megawati Soekarnoputri, the previous vice-president, was appointed by the MPR as
the fifth Indonesian president in 2001. The Megawati administration enacted a number of
laws including Law No. 17 (2003) on State Finance, Law No. 1 (2004) on the State
Treasury and Law No. 33 (2004) on the Fiscal Balance between the Central and Local
Government. One of the key features of Law No. 17 (2003) was a decision to adopt an
accrual-based accounting system in place of a long-practised cash-based accounting
system.
The important feature of Law No. 1 (2004) was to require governmental agencies to
implement accrual-based accounting no later than the year 2008. Law No. 33 (2004)
regulated the formula of sharing between the central and local governments concerning the
revenues obtained by the state.
In addition, the Megawati administration also endorsed Law No. 32 (2004) on Local
Government to replace Law No. 22 (1999) on Local Government. This law marked a new
chapter in the history of local-government accountability system, in which the law regards
the public, as well as the central government (president) and local parliament, as the
audience of local-government accountability reports. The law requires local government to
submit accountability reports to the central government and local parliament (the LPPD and
LKPj, respectively), and to make an accountability report (the ILPPD) available to the
public.
This law also stipulated that the heads of provincial and district government were to
be directly elected by people; thus they were no longer appointed by local parliament as
regulated in Law No. 22 (1999). However, Law No. 32 (2004) abolished the authority of
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local parliament in the accountability forum to impose sanctions on the head of local
government, as stipulated in Law No. 22 (1999). This has constituted a drawback for the
local-government accountability forum, since the forum has now lost its capacity to
possibly impose sanctions as suggested by Bovens (2007a) and Mulgan (2000a).
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono served as the sixth Indonesian president between 2004
and 2009, after defeating the incumbent president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, in the first
direct presidential election in 2004.
The Yudhoyono administration endorsed Government Regulation No. 3 (2007) on
Accountability Reporting of Local Government which regulates the mechanism of localgovernment accountability reporting in more detail. However, among the three entities to
whom the local government reports, the public receives the most limited information, as the
accountability report they receive (ILPPD) is only a summary of that submitted to the
central government (LPPD).
A study conducted by the DRSP (2009) revealed that Indonesian local
governments’ accountability reports contained poor-quality data. Smoke (2005) noted that
although Indonesian local governments are required to comply with various forms of public
reporting, they lacked transparency in managing their administrations.
In a similar vein, Goetz and Jenkins (2001) wrote that the public distrusted the
political and administrative forms of accountability in most developing countries. In the
Indonesian context, these phenomena are partly caused by the lack of institutional capacity
of Indonesian local governments (DRSP, 2009; Harun & Kamase, 2012). Mountfield and
Wong (2005, p. 89) disclosed another cause for distrust: Indonesian local governments’
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“monitoring and accounting systems often produce data that are neither timely nor
accurate”.
On the side of local parliaments (DPRD), Green (2005) maintained that Indonesian
local parliaments do not have proper criteria with which to assess local government
accountability reports; even worse, they employ “arbitrary standards” (p.138). A study
conducted by SMERU (2001) in 10 provinces within Indonesia, including South
Kalimantan province, found that the public perceived that members of local parliaments
preferred to pursue their own interests instead of the public interest.
Sarman (2007) asserted that the South Kalimantan Provincial Parliament
demonstrates poor performance in formulating and producing by-laws that push the
executive to promote people’s welfare. Natural-resources management, for instance, is not
regulated with an integrated regulatory framework. As a result, the exploitation of natural
resources within the province leaves widespread environmental damage (JATAM, 2010).
Likewise, ADB (2004b) found that Indonesian local parliaments were still not able to
conduct oversight tasks properly due to the members’ low capabilities for doing such tasks.
In a similar vein, DRSP (2009) concurred this view that Indonesian local
governments lack the capacity to discharge their main tasks: legislation, budgeting and
control. As result, they have not yet played significant roles in monitoring local
governments.
To conclude, both executive and legislative branch of power lack institutional
capacity in conducting their respective roles. As a result, the checks and balances
mechanism has not yet existed properly in Indonesia.
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The next sub-section presents information about the accountability forum—the
forum through which the power-holders are held accountable by the relevant entities.
2.7.3. Accountability Forum as Part of Accountability Mechanism
As stated previously, this study employs a definition of accountability proposed by
Bovens (2007a). According to Bovens (2007a), an accountability forum is one of the
elements of accountability through which the power-holders are held accountable by the
account-holders for what they have done (Bovens, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Mulgan, 2000a,
2003; Rahman, 2008; Hodge, 2009).
Having an accountability forum has at least two possible consequences for the
power-holders: boosting their legitimacy or receiving sanctions (Bovens, 2007a; Mulgan,
2003). The sanctions imposed on the power-holders are intended to endorse the executive
being on the right track in exercising their power (Bovens, 2007a; Mulgan, 2003; Rahman,
2008; Mezey, 2008).
In the public sector, the role of parliaments is essential, as they have mandates to
hold the executives accountable (Rahman, 2008). Legislation usually requires the
executives to submit their accountability reports to the parliaments, as the accountability
reports are considered as a medium of accountability discharge as suggested by Boyne and
Law (1991), Coy and Pratt (1998), Taylor and Rosair (2000), and Ryan et al. (2002). On
the legislature side, the accountability report is important, because the report is an input for
legislative oversight (Mulgan, 2001; Hughes, 2003; Rahman, 2008).
In the Indonesian context, as stated previously, during the Soeharto regime (19671998), local parliaments did not serve properly as oversight bodies, as almost all members
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of parliaments across the country were the regime’s representatives instead of the people’s
delegates. The fall of the Soeharto regime has changed the Indonesian political landscape.
Legislation now protects the right of citizens to establish new political parties and put an
end to the limited party system. This political reform has affected Indonesian parliaments
across the country, in that they are no longer dominated by an authoritarian regime’s
political party (Golkar). Rather, the seats in the parliaments have been distributed to several
political parties.
According to DRSP (2009) and ADB (2004b), Indonesian local parliaments lack
capacity in evaluating local-government accountability reports. Mulgan (2003) maintained
that the power-holders have a tendency to report their account in overly positive tones. To
cope with this issue, parliaments should have a reliable mechanism for assessing their
executives’ accountability report, as suggested by Rahman (2008) and Mezey (2008), to
keep the power-holders reporting honestly.
Given this fact, it is relevant to see how local parliament evaluates the localgovernment accountability report in the accountability forum, in which the political
landscape has dramatically changed following the collapse of the authoritarian Soeharto
regime.

2.8. Conclusion
Accountability is a long-standing concept, dating back to around 2000 BC and the
Code of Hammurabi. In its development, accountability can be divided into two schools of
thought: accountability as a virtue, and accountability as a mechanism.
45

Chapter Two

Most American scholars have perceived accountability as a set of standards in
assessing the conduct or behaviour of public officials based on righteousness or virtue.
They emphasise the personal values of the actors. In contrast, European, Australian and
Canadian scholars have tended to view accountability as a societal arrangement and
institutional relationship through which the principal can hold the agent to account. In this
respect, the focal point of this study is on the existence and role of the institutional
mechanism, instead of the personal behaviour of the actors.
Considering Indonesia’s social, cultural and political contexts, this study employs
the definition of accountability as a mechanism. This does not mean that accountability as a
virtue is less important or less valuable. Rather, this study focuses more on the mechanism
of accountability systems of local government in the reform era, in which the political
environment has completely changed.

During the Soeharto regime (1967-1998), the

mechanism of the local-government accountability system was suppressed by the regime,
since most of the members of local parliaments across the country were controlled. As a
result, legislative bodies throughout the country did not serve as oversight councils that
monitored the executives. Therefore, an investigation into the practice of accountability as a
mechanism in the post-Soeharto regime is needed.
The next chapter describes the history and legacy of the Soeharto regime so that the
current local-government reporting can be understood in its context.
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the Soeharto Regime

3.1. Introduction
This chapter presents a brief history of Indonesia; this is necessary to understand the
historical context in which local-government accountability reporting currently takes place.
Within Indonesian history, the Soeharto regime is the longest-ruling regime (1967-1998) in
the post-colonial era; thus it is likely that the legacies of his administration have influenced
today’s Indonesian governmental agencies at all levels, including the practice of localgovernment accountability reporting. This chapter’s three sections examine the history of
Indonesia (section 3.2) and the legacies of the Soeharto regime (section 3.3), and offer
some conclusions (section 3.4).

3.2. The History of Indonesia
This section provides a brief history of Indonesia that will be beneficial in
understanding the context within which this study is conducted.
Indonesia was colonised from the early 16th to the mid-20th century by Portugal,
England and the Netherlands. Indonesia was also briefly occupied by Japan during World
War II (Drakeley, 2005). Among the colonial rulers, the Dutch colonised the country for
the longest period, almost three and a half centuries (1596-1942) (Ricklefs, 2001). During
this era, people at the lowest socioeconomic level suffered the most, while some royal
families and bureaucratic elites by cooperating with the colonial regimes. This situation
47

Chapter Three

aroused the people to liberate the nation from colonisation by armed and diplomatic
struggles (Vickers, 2005).
Indonesia achieved its independence in 1945, following the defeat of Japan by the
Allied troops in World War II (Ricklefs, 2001). On behalf of the Indonesian people,
Soekarno and Hatta declared Indonesian independence on 17 August, 1945. The
Preparatory Committee of the Independence of Indonesia (PPKI) then appointed Soekarno
and Hatta as the first Indonesian president and vice-president, and endorsed the 1945
constitution on 18 August, 1945. The 1945 constitution divides administrative power into
three branches: executive, legislative and judiciary as suggested by the French philosopher
Montesquieu (1689-1755) (see Pirie, 2009).
Soekarno faced constant political and social upheavals during his administration. At
the peak, the coup exercised by Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on September 30, 1965
made the situation getting worse. Soekarno assigned Soeharto to restore public order by
signing a letter of instruction, called “Supersemar” (surat perintah sebelas maret), on
March 11, 1966. Soeharto successfully restored public order and tackled the political and
social unrests. The MPRS (upper house) then withdrew Soekarno’s presidential mandate
and appointed Soeharto as acting president on March 12, 1967 (Ricklefs, 2001).
Following his appointment, Soeharto took important measures, including merging
and establishing direct control over the four military forces (army, navy, air force and
police) in August 1967. Soeharto was formally appointed as Indonesian president by the
MPRS in March 1968. To silence potentially critical groups, the Soeharto regime limited
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the freedom of the press (Ricklefs, 2001). The Soeharto regime had become a centralised
government that powerfully controlled local governments across Indonesia.
During 1967-1998, the Soeharto regime encountered both military and civilian
opposition, but he was still too strong to be ousted. It

remained

so

until

the

Asian

economic crisis in mid-1997, which shook the Indonesian economy and led to the inflation
in the price of basic needs and a plummeting Indonesian currency exchanges.
The Soeharto regime’s failure to manage the crisis, combined with its corruption,
led to growing public dissatisfaction with the regime. As the situation worsened, four
students were killed by military officers in a demonstration on May 12, 1998 (Ricklefs,
2001). This incident sparked the anger of the people and the situation became
uncontrollable. On 21 May, 1998, Soeharto resigned as the president of the Republic of
Indonesia, and the vice-president, B.J. Habibie, was appointed as the president by the
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).
The rise of B.J. Habibie as the third Indonesian president in 1998 marked the
beginning of the reform era in Indonesian history and transformed into a newly democratic
state. The Habibie administration, for instance, endorsed decentralisation reform through
Law No. 22 (1999) on Local Government (Anwar, 2010). It also granted and protected the
freedom of the press through Law No. 40 (1999) on the Press (Anwar, 2010).
The next section will describe the legacies of the Soeharto regime and their effects
on Indonesia’s political system as they relate to this study.
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3.3. The Legacies of the Soeharto Regime
This section identifies the Soeharto regime’s persistent legacies and how they may
affect the practice of local-government accountability reporting.
3.3.1. Golkar: The Soeharto Regime-Sponsored Political Party
Soeharto reinforced the role of Golkar, the political party established by the armed
forces in 1964, to be the majority party in the legislative bodies across Indonesia, to back
up his regime (Ricklefs, 2001). For example, the “dual-function” doctrine, or dwi-fungsi
ABRI2, stipulated the two main roles of the armed forces as defence and the maintenance of
social and political order (Liddle, 1996). This gave rise to Indonesia’s peculiar political
system, in which active and retired military personnel appointed by the armed-forces
commander occupied 20% of parliamentary seats3 across the country without being elected
by the people (Liddle, 1999; Chalmers, 2006). The regime also designated a number of
army officers to hold strategic positions in Golkar.
Limits on the public’s freedom to participate in the political sphere resulted in a
decline in the number of parties participating in elections; this was particularly apparent in
the 1971 election (the second election in Indonesian history), in which only 10 parties
participated (Liddle, 1978), compared with 48 in the first election in 1955. Golkar then won

2

Dwi-fungsi ABRI, in which the Indonesian Armed Forces served both security and political roles, was
designed by General Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958. However, his idea was that the military would play a
political role only temporarily, to address political instability at that time (Vatikiostis, 2004).
3
“Parliament” here refers to the houses of representatives in which the members were chosen through
election. There were three types of parliament: national (DPR-lower house), provincial (DPRD Provinsi) and
district (DPRD Kabupaten/Kota). The upper houses (MPR) of each of these types included all members of the
respective DPRs (lower houses), along with representatives of various societal groups (utusan golongan) as
determined by the regime.
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the election by securing 62.80% of the vote, while the NU and PNI followed, with 18.67%
and 6.94% respectively (Liddle, 1978).
The regime then simplified the party system by merging nine parties into two in
1973 (Liddle, 1978). The PNI (the biggest party in the 1955 election), Parkindo, Partai
Murba, IPKI and Partai Katolik were forced to merge into a new party, the PDI (Indonesian
Democratic Party) (Liddle, 1978). Similarly, four Muslim parties the NU, Parmusi, PSII
and Perti were compelled to fuse into the PPP (United Development Party) (Liddle, 1978).
However, Golkar, the regime’s party, was not restructured at all. Since then, only the three
parties resulting from the amalgamations (PPP, PDI and Golkar) have ever taken part in the
elections. As a result, all six elections held during the Soeharto regime (1971, 1977, 1982,
1987, 1992 and 1997) were won by Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group).
With a simple majority in the parliament, Golkar played a key role in shaping
Indonesian parliaments at all levels throughout the country. Programs and works were
aligned with the regime’s wishes, and were not criticised. Parliaments across the country
served merely to rubber-stamp the regime’s initiatives (Ledergerber & Susanti, 2007).
The collapse of Soeharto regime in 1998 did not necessarily have a negative effect
on Golkar status; it not only survived but quickly consolidated its position by winning the
2004 legislative election (Bünte & Ufen, 2009; Tomsa, 2009).
Golkar, the Soeharto regime's party, dominated the Indonesian political sphere,
including its legislative bodies, for more than three decades. Golkar has thus had a crucial
role in shaping the way legislative bodies control and criticise the executives or do not. This
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reluctance to act as a check on the executive persists, even in the reform era (Ziegenhain,
2009).
3.3.2. Self-Interested Behaviour of Members of Parliaments
As stated previously, during the Soeharto regime the armed forces occupied 20% of
the total seats in parliaments nationwide without being elected by the people. Meanwhile,
Golkar secured the majority of seats in all parliamentary elections held by the regime. In
these elections, Golkar managed around 67.5% of the vote on average for the national
parliament (DPR) (Suryadinata, 2007).
Provincial and district parliaments nationwide more or less followed the same
pattern as the national parliament. Parliaments became, in effect, representatives of the
Soeharto regime rather than of the people. Meanwhile, the two remaining political parties,
the PPP and PDI, merely served as complementary participants in a political process
controlled by the regime (Liddle, 1996). As a consequence, parliaments across the country
lost their function as oversight bodies (Ledergerber & Susanti, 2007; Anwar, 2010)
According to the 1945 constitution, parliaments have three main tasks: legislation,
budgeting and control. However, the members of parliament did not act to keep the
government on the right track. State funds, for instance, were administered as part of the
private accounts of government officials (Hart, 2001). As a result, corruption was rampant
and pervasive (Hart, 2001). Moreover, members of parliament sought to retain their
positions by being submissive to the regime.
In short, members of parliaments did not behave as true representatives of the
people; rather they were the regime’s representatives, in return for personal benefit.
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3.3.3. Symbolic Display of Audit Bodies
The BPK (Supreme Audit Agency), established in 1947, was originally intended as
the only independent and external audit agency, as suggested by the 1945 Constitution
(BPK, 2009e). However, this intended role was undermined by limitations placed by the
Soeharto regime on its objects, scope and method of audit, as well as the contents of audit
reports as regulated in Law No. 5 (1973) (BPK, 2009e). To make matters worse, in 1983
the role of the BPK was to a large extent taken over by the new BPKP (Financial and
Development Supervisory Agency) (BPK, 2009e; ADB, 2004b), an audit agency
established in 1983 through Presidential Decree No. 31 (1983). This marked the end of an
independent and external audit agency. For instance, the BPK could not audit lucrative
government agencies or state-owned enterprises such as the Indonesian Tax Office,
Department of Forestry and Pertamina (Nasution, 2006). Moreover, to reinforce national
stability, BPK’s audit results were presented to align with the regime’s wishes (Nasution,
2006).
The regime also created "a multiple-layer of audit bodies" that controlled
governmental organisations (BPK, 2009e; ADB, 2004b). At the national level, the
Inspectorate General (Irjen) operated in each department/ministry, and the BPKP (Financial
and Development Supervisory Agency) had the authority to audit any governmental bodies
(BPK, 2009e; ADB, 2004b). At the provincial and district level, there were the provincial
internal control agency (inspektorat provinsi) and the district internal control agency
(inspektorat kabupaten/kota), respectively (BPK, 2009e; ADB, 2004b).
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However, instead of controlling governmental organisations, these audit bodies
merely served as a symbolic display to show to the public that multiple-layers of controls
were in place. The audit bodies acted as camouflage for the regime’s financial
irregularities.
3.3.4. Keenness to Build “Good Impressions"
Building "good impressions" within a relatively a less-educated society, like
Indonesia, might be effective in winning public support. Taking advantage of traditions in
the Javanese culture, Soeharto projected himself as a “benevolent ruler”, and the Indonesian
people as an “obedient populace” (Liddle, 1996): in other words, he projected the
impression that the power he held was for the good of the people, and whatever his policies
and measures, the people should not voice any criticism; rather, they should actively
support him.
For example, Soeharto established a number of charitable foundations (yayasan),
including Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (YAMP), Supersemar and Dharmais. YAMP is
widely regarded as a generous foundation due to its initiatives in building mosques not only
in big cities but in smaller towns as well. Supersemar granted scholarships to students
nationwide at all level of education, from primary school to university. Dharmais
distributed social aid and health services to disadvantaged people. The activities of these
foundations contributed to Soeharto’s successful management of his public image as
benevolent ruler. Liddle (1996) asserts that the charitable foundations established by
Soeharto were designated to amass, and then disguise, the bribes given by some business
executives as a token of gratitude for concessions and privileges.
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To conclude, in order to maintain and preserve his power, Soeharto created a good
image for his administration in the public sphere by establishing a number of foundations.
Through such foundations, Soeharto promoted himself as a good leader who always did
good deeds for the sake of his people. Soeharto thus successfully distracted people from
questioning his authoritarian administration.
3.3.5. Politicised Bureaucracy
In addition to making use of the armed forces and Golkar, the Soeharto regime also
forced the bureaucracy to support his regime (Liddle, 1985). In February 1970, the regime
declared that all civil servants (PNS) across the country had to vote only for Golkar, not the
PPP or PDI (Ricklef, 2001). The civil servants’ union was organised into a single
organisation, the Indonesian Civil Servants Association (Korpri), controlled by Golkar
(Vatikiotis, 2003).
Even village administrations4, the lowest level of Indonesian bureaucracy, were
controlled by the Soeharto regime. According to Law No. 5 (1979) on Village
Administration, for instance, village communities could merely nominate candidates for
village head; the actual appointment was made by the head of the sub-district (camat)
(Ricklefs, 2001). Not surprisingly, development programs run by the village
administrations represented the regime's wishes, rather than the people's.
In conclusion, realising the potential of Indonesian civil servants across the country,
the Soeharto regime had coerced and politicised the civil servants to become one of its

4
Indonesian government system at that time could be divided into five levels: central, provincial, district, subdistrict (kecamatan), and village (kelurahan/desa).
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main political proponents. These measures helped the Soeharto regime to persist for more
than three decades.
3.3.6. Corruption
As discussed earlier, the parliament has three main tasks: legislation, budgeting and
control, as mandated by the 1945 constitution. In relation to the control task, the members
of parliament have not kept the regime going in the right direction. The parliament has also
not been productive in terms of the number of laws issued (Anwar, 2010), particularly
regarding the eradication of corruption. During the Soeharto regime, Law No. 3 (1971) on
the Suppression of Criminal Corruption and Law No. 11 (1980) on Bribery were the only
two measures passed that attempted to control it (Hornick, 2001).
Although the regulatory framework on corruption was in place, enforcement was
very weak. Even judges and prosecutors were involved in corruption (Hornick, 2001).
Moreover, the control function granted to the parliament by the constitution was not carried
out appropriately. Consequently, corruption was rampant, including in the legislature itself
(Ziegenhain, 2009; Makarim, 2001; Hart, 2001; Ledergerber & Susanti, 2007).
Furthermore, Bünte and Ufen (2009, p. 18) noted the collusive practice between
legislative and executive officials in committing corruption:
With the absence of a strong rule of law, the legal framework was often abused by
alliances of politicians, bureaucrats and private interests for rent-seeking activities.
Moreover, he illustrates that decentralization had a number of side effects, such as
the rise of corruption and money politics, the consolidation of local oligarchies and
the revival of primordialism.

56

Chapter Three

Thus, corruption in Indonesia became systemic, involving actors in the circle of
decision-making in both the executive and legislative branches (Cole, 2001).

3.4. Conclusion
Although the New Order regime collapsed more than a decade ago, its legacies
persist. This might be because obedient behaviours (acquiescent and compromising
responses are discussed in Chapter 5) were perpetuated for more than three decades, and
thus entrenched in Indonesian public-sector organisations, including not only legislative
bodies, but executive and judicial organisations as well.
This chapter has discussed the broad Indonesian political background within which
the study takes place. The next chapter looks at the more specific South Kalimantan local
government region, in which this study is set.
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Chapter 4: The South Kalimantan
Provincial Government

4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the context in which the South Kalimantan Provincial
Government’s accountability reporting takes place can be understood: specifically, the
history, environmental setting and organisational culture and structure of the South
Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG).
The chapter’s sections cover the Indonesian government organisation in brief
(section 4.2), South Kalimantan Province (section 4.3), Banjarese institutions (section 4.4),
the practice of accounting in the socio-religious context (section 4.5), the accountability
system and reporting under the Yudhoyono administration (section 4.6), the South
Kalimantan Provincial Government (section 4.7), and offer conclusions (section 4.8).

4.2. Indonesian Government Organisation in Brief
There are three levels of government units in Indonesia relevant to this study: the
central, provincial and district governments (GR No. 3 (2007)). The central government is
led by a president; the provincial governments by a governor; and district governments by a
regent or mayor. The central government’s administration is run by ministry and nonministry units. Ministry units are led by ministers; non-ministry units are headed by
chairpersons; both are directly responsible to the president.

58

Chapter Four

Administratively, Indonesia has 33 provinces and 497 cities/regencies across
Indonesia.5 The ministry of home affairs (Kementerian Dalam Negeri) is given authority by
the president to manage provincial and district governments. Thus, governors and
mayors/regents are ultimately responsible to the president, through the minister of home
affairs. Apart from this, provincial and district governments have to be accountable to their
respective local parliaments annually through accountability forums held by local
parliaments.

4.3. South Kalimantan Province
South Kalimantan Province has a geographical context made complicated by both
its history of deep religious traditions and its rich mineral resources; the former explains
how the religious traditions exist in the society and the latter presents how the province
manages its natural resources.
Under the provincial government, there are 13 district administrations: Banjarmasin,
Barito Kuala, Banjarbaru, Banjar, Tapin, Hulu Sungai Selatan, Hulu Sungai Tengah, Hulu
Sungai Utara, Balangan, Tabalong, Tanah Bumbu, Kotabaru and Tanah Laut.

5

Home Affairs Ministry website, http://www.depdagri.go.id/basisdata/2010/01/28/daftar-provinsi, accessed
29 July 2010.
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Figure 4.1. Map of Indonesia

According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, the population of South
Kalimantan province is about 3.4 million (BPS, Kalimantan Selatan, 2009). The Banjarese
ethnic group accounts for 75% of the total population (Chalmers, 2007), with the remainder
made up of other ethnic groups such as Javanese, Dayak and Buginese. Banjarese is the
most-spoken local language.
According to Geertz (1971), South Kalimantan is one of the gateways of early
Islamic propagation in Indonesia, along with Northern Sumatera, Southwest Malaya, North
Java and South Celebes by Indian traders. Not surprisingly, about 90% of the South
Kalimantan people practise Islam, with the rest practising other religions such as
Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. Given this situation, South Kalimantan is known as
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an Islamic religious society. It is quite easy, for instance, to find Islamic places of worship
such as mosques and langgars (little mosques). According to Chalmers (2007), Banjarese
society is keen to establish mosques and langgars. My observations on site suggest that
these serve not only as places of worship but also as religious symbols of the society (see
also Karni & Hidayat, 2006).
Religious rites, such as tasmiyah (naming ceremony for newborn babies),
sembahyang hajat (prayers for special wishes), nisfu sya'ban (religious observances ahead
of the month of fasting or Ramadhan) and haulan (the observance of a loved one's death),
are preserved from generation to generation and intertwined with the local culture (Daud,
1997). The pervasiveness of these rites brings gurus (religious leaders) to the centre of the
society. They serve not only as religious leaders, but also as informal leaders whose
opinions the people seek regarding the issues they face in their daily lives. Gurus are widely
perceived as wise and paternal; thus their views (including their political stances) are
worthy of attention.
Agriculture forms the main livelihood of the South Kalimantan population,
employing about 46% of working people (BPS Kalimantan Selatan, 2009). The combined
sectors of mining, manufacturing, electricity and civil works employ 14% (BPS Kalimantan
Selatan, 2009), although mining itself employs just 2% (Fatah, 2008). The remainder work
in sectors such as trading, retail, restaurant, hotel, transportation, warehouse,
communication, insurance and finance and other business services (BPS Kalimantan
Selatan, 2009).
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The province also has been endowed with quite rich natural resources, such as
forests, iron, manganites, nickel, chromites and coal. However, during the Soeharto regime,
forest resources had been severely depleted. The main beneficiary of this depletion was
Soeharto’s family, his cronies and bureaucrats in both the central and local governments
(provincial and district) (Ricklefs, 2001). The deforestation left environmental damage and
uneven economic benefits for the general population (Ricklefs, 2001).
South Kalimantan is also rich in coal resources. Indonesia is estimated to have 57
trillion tons of coal, which is mainly scattered in three provinces: East Kalimantan (35%),
South Sumatera (33%) and South Kalimantan (16%) (PSE UI, 2002, cited in Fatah, 2008).
South Kalimantan province is the second-biggest producer of coal nationally, with more
than 70 million tons in each of the years from 2008 to 2010).6 Coal-mining sites are located
in seven districts: Banjar, Tapin, Balangan, Tabalong, Kotabaru, Tanah Bumbu and Tanah
Laut.
The next section depicts the South Kalimantan Provincial Government as the
context for this case study into Indonesia’s local-government accountability.

4.4. Banjarese Institutions
This section describes the prevailing institutions in South Kalimantan Province that
might affect the practice of accountability as well as the political landscape the province.

6
Source: Indonesian Coal Mining Association (APBI-Asosiasi Pertambangan Batubara Indonesia)
http://www.apbi-icma.com/chart.php?act=prodregion, accessed 28 March 2012.
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South Kalimantan Province is the home of the Banjarese ethnic group; this group
constitutes 75% of the total population (Chalmers, 2007), along with other ethnic groups
such as Javanese, Dayak and Buginese, comprising a total population of 3,250,100 (BPS
Kalimantan Selatan, 2007). Banjarese people are considered enthusiastic in their religious
observances, such as building mosques and langgar (little mosques) as religious symbols
(Chalmers, 2007). Not surprisingly, mosques and langgars, as well as religious rites such as
haulan (commemorating the death of family members or gurus), are easily found within the
province. Most particularly, Banjar District has been called the serambi mekkah (the
veranda of Mecca) of South Kalimantan (Karni & Hidayat, 2006) due to its pervasive
Islamic observances as well as the presence of several Islamic boarding schools
(pesantren).
The renowned Islamic scholar, teacher and author, Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad Al
Banjari, lived in the Banjar District between 1710 and 1812 (Azra, 2004). One of his
outstanding books, Sabilal Muhtadin (“the way of those who are guided by God”), is
memorialised in the name of one of the largest mosques in Banjarmasin (the capital city of
South Kalimantan Province). Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad Al Banjari advised the Banjarese
Sultan regarding Islamic jurisprudence. These attributes have led him to be greatly
honoured by South Kalimantan society (and even Muslims from neighbouring countries
such as Malaysia and Singapore). These days the descendants of Syeikh Muhammad
Arsyad Al Banjariare, including some renowned gurus, are scattered everywhere
particularly on Kalimantan Island.
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One of these gurus was K.H. Zaini Ghani, popularly known as Guru Ijai or Guru
Sekumpul, who lived between 1942 and 2005. Originally, gurus in South Kalimantan
served mainly as religious leaders. Over time, due to their extensive engagement with
people in daily religious activities, they also served as informal societal leaders with whom
people consulted, not only on religious matters but also on the affairs of daily life. Guru
Sekumpul was widely perceived to have multiple-roles as a religious, informal and
charismatic leader. Due to his charisma, Guru Sekumpul was greatly respected by the
majority of South Kalimantan people and other gurus within Kalimantan and the Java
Island. Thousands—on Sunday afternoon, this figure could rise to more than 10,000—
attended his religious services. Because of his great influence, public officials, business
executives, ministers and even some Indonesian presidents (including Abdurrahman
Wahid, Megawati, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) visited him (Rosyadi, 2006). Some,
presumably to show the people that they shared their values (in this case, respect for gurus
as religious and informal leader), sought his blessing. This would make their legitimacy
easier to secure. A sociologist from University of Lambung Mangkurat, Mr. C1 said:
In order to win a gubernatorial or regent election, the candidates should embrace
prevailing institutions and customs in South Kalimantan. One of these is paying
great respect toward gurus.7

Photos of Guru Sekumpul are easily found in most houses in South Kalimantan
Province, particularly among traditional Muslims (nahdhiyin).8 By hanging his photo in

7

Thought sharing with Mr. C1 made during the site visit of this study.
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their homes or/and shops, his followers believe they will obtain blessings from God,
because Guru Sekumpul was a Waliy Qutb (a person having a high level of piety and a
close relationship with God). His followers transcend South Kalimantan provincial borders,
being found in Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, East Java and Jakarta; they mostly
come from traditional Muslims groups, who revere gurus much more strongly than modern
Muslims. It should be noted that there are many more traditional Muslims in South
Kalimantan Province than modern Muslims.
It has been a longstanding cultural institution for anyone who wishes to hold a
public office such as governor, regent or mayor in the South Kalimantan region to secure
gurus' blessing, before standing for office. Mr. C3, a political observer from Lambung
Mangkurat University said that:
The (current)governor was a cunning politician, because he could shrewdly play the
prevailing institutions in the society in return for boosting his legitimacy.9
4.4.1. Current Governor of South Kalimantan Province
Long before being elected as the governor of South Kalimantan in 2005, Rudy
Ariffin (the current governor) frequently attended religious services held by Guru
Sekumpul (Rosyadi, 2006). His rise as the secretary of the Banjar district in 1997-2000, the
second-highest post in the district administration, made him accustomed to cultivating a
good relationship with Guru Sekumpul. By fostering such good relationships, he eventually

8

Muslim society in South Kalimantan can be divided into two groups: traditional and modern. Traditional
Muslims highly respect gurus and perceive them as omniscient figures; some gurus, like Guru Sekumpul, are
even acknowledged as saint-like leaders. In contrast, modern Muslims perceive gurus as ordinary humans, as
prone as any other human to making mistakes.
9
Thought sharing with Mr. C3 made during the site visit of this study.
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secured the guru’s blessing to compete in the 2000 Banjar district regent election. The
blessing of Guru Sekumpul served as "political capital" and he was popularly predicted to
be the winner of the election. Guru Sekumpul’s charisma and influence in South
Kalimantan society gave him significant influence over the members of the district
parliament10. Ignoring his opinion would cause the parliamentary members to lose
credibility and legitimacy with the people. As predicted, Ariffin was elected as the regent
of Banjar District. Two months later, in an announcement covered widely in the press,
Guru Sekumpul made a public statement: “I adopt you (Rudy Ariffin) as my son in the
world and the hereafter” (Rosyadi, p. 107, 2006). Securing such a blessing as the adopted
son of Guru Sekumpul could mean Ariffin was gaining electoral support endorsed by
informal and charismatic leader for next gubernatorial election.
It is important to note that during his administration as the regent of Banjar district
2000-2005, he had very few outstanding achievements. In relation to the accountability
reports, for instance, there was no administrative breakthrough that marked him out as an
exceptional head of district. The public did not know exactly what he had already done,
because there was no accountability report available to them. In addition, in terms of
financial accountability, for instance, which is audited by the Supreme Audit Agency, his
administration never obtained an unqualified pass during 2000-2005.
Interestingly, five years later, in the 2005 South Kalimantan gubernatorial election,
Rudy Ariffin successfully defeated the incumbent governor. The blessing given by Guru

10

At the time the governor and regent were still elected by local parliament rather than directly by the people.
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Sekumpul was believed to have been an important factor in his victory (Karni & Hidayat,
2006). Similarly, many candidates for the post of governor, regent, mayor, and member of
parliament sought his blessing before competing in elections.
Apart from his strategy of cultivating a good relationship with Guru Sekumpul and
other gurus, Ariffin also paid close attention to religious institutions across the district.
Specifically, he had an "institutional initiative" to preserve the existence of religious
symbols and the heritage of the Banjar District. Ahead of the end of his term as the regent
in 2004, for instance, using his authority as a regent, he allocated US$ 2.7 million (IDR 25
billion) from the district's budget to renovate the beautiful and majestic Al Karomah
mosque (Masjid Agung Al Karomah) in downtown Martapura (the capital city of Banjar
District). He thus positioned himself as the leader who not only respected but preserved
important cultural and religious institutions.
Ariffin then governed South Kalimantan Province for the 2005-2010 period. It
should be noted that under the Ariffin administration, the province's economy grew at 5 to
6% during 2005-2008 (BPS Kalimantan Selatan, 2009). The SKPG also was granted an
investment award by the central government in 2008 because the province was the thirdmost-favoured investment destination out of Indonesia’s 33 provinces. However, it was
apparent that the Ariffin administration lacked transparency (as discussed in Chapter 7 of
this study). The SKPG’s financial statements never secured an unqualified pass from the
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK, 2006; 2012). Moreover, the province was ranked 26th of 33
provinces across the nation during 2005-2009 in terms of human development index,
despite its being the second-largest-coal-producing province in Indonesia.
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The governor succeeded in retaining his power by winning the 2010 South
Kalimantan gubernatorial election in a landslide. He employed the same strategy as when
he had secured the posts of regent of Banjar District in 2000 and governor of South
Kalimantan Province in 2005: embracing and conforming to the prevailing institutions in
South Kalimantan, such as being respectful to and maintaining good relationships with
gurus, paying attention to religious symbols such as mosques and langgar and attending
religious rites (Karni & Hidayat, 2006; Rosyadi, 2006).

4.5. The Practice of Accounting in the Socio-religious Context
Gambling (1974, p. 107, cited in Maurer, 2002) noted that “accounting theory and
culture are not readily separable”. Carruthers & Espeland (1991) went further, saying that
culture shapes accounting practices. This might be possible because the accounting
practices are cultural phenomena (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991) that are linked to historical
context and tradition (Lewis, 2001; Napier, 2009).
Christopher Napier (2009), an accounting history researcher wrote the early
development of Islamic accounting may have been emerging in Indonesia around 1800,
particularly in Jawa or Sumatra region. However, Napier (2009) further noted that this
claim was not supported by adequate evidence. A closer investigation shows the early
development of accounting, particularly Islamic accounting has been taking place in South
Kalimantan in the nineteenth century.
It is difficult to disentangle accounting from religious values as claimed by
Carruthers and Espeland (1991). They asserted that the early development of accounting in
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Italy was influenced by divine values, as accounting was developed by a Franciscan monk,
Frater Lucas Pacioli (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991). Thus, it is quite plausible to link the
contribution of Islamic values to the development of accounting in South Kalimantan, as
Islam was official religion of the Banjarmasin Sultanate at that time (Azra, 2004).
This is evidenced by the work of Syeikh Muhamad Arsyad Al-Banjari entitled
Sabilal Muhtadin ([1882], 2005). The book contained a detailed procedure and calculation
on how a Muslim (an Islamic adherent) should pay his/her zakat (compulsory alms) to
charity based on Muslim’s wealth.
To support this religious obligation was conducted properly by the people as
required by shariah (Islamic jurisprudence), Al-Banjari ([1882], 2005) explained this issue
in a quite great detailed (pp. 745-831), based on sort of business run by Muslims such as
agriculture, trading and mining. The crops harvested from fields that used waterwheel
(kincir air) in watering the plants, for instance, are charged with lower percentage of zakat
(5 % from the total harvest); while the crops gained from the fields that rely on rain are
imposed with higher percentage of zakat (10%) (Al-Banjari, 2005). The rationality of these
two different percentages of zakat was because in the first case, farmers invested more
money to build and maintain the waterwheel, while in the latter case required much less
cost, if not at all (Al-Banjari, 2005).
According to Gambling and Karim (1986), Zakat or compulsory alms is part of
Islamic accounting that should be recorded in a proper way, and in the hereafter each
Muslim will be held accountable by God about what has been done in world, including the
obligation to pay zakat. Lewis (200, p. 103) maintained that “accounting in the broad sense
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is central to Islam, since accountability to God and the community for all activities is
paramount to Muslim’s faith”. Thus, the practice of accounting that complied with such
religious tenets not only does bring technical and symbolic power, but also divine
legitimation as suggested by Carruthers and Espeland (1991).
The appointment of Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari as a mufti11 of the
Banjarmasin Sultanate around 1773 boosted the practice of Islamic accounting more
institutionalised in the society, as Al-Banjari has the authority to issue Islamic legal opinion
to the people of South Kalimantan (Azra, 2004). While at the same time, this move
espoused symbolic power to the Sultan of Banjarmasin, because his administration was
backed by a highly respected guru who had extensive Islamic knowledge.
During his life (1710-1812), Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari wrote 14 books
including Sabilal Muhtadin that contained 1143 pages in length (Syukur, 2009; Al-Banjari,
2005). Al-Banjari also fostered the society with a scholarly tradition in studying the
knowledge, by lecturing and discussing the subject equipped with written material (Syukur,
2005); instead of transmitting the knowledge

through an oral method with one-way

communication as practiced by many gurus at that time. The using of written material that
come along with his lectures might have been influenced by his experience in studying
various Islamic books from many ulamas (Islamic scholars) for thirty-five year in Saudi
Arabia.

11

A mufti is an Islamic scholar who has the authority to issue Islamic legal opinions or fatawa.
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The passing of Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari in 1812 made the
development of Islamic accounting in South Kalimantan getting standstill. Later
generations of gurus appear to be more interested on Islam as a ritual-rich religion. As a
result, Islamic public lectures tend to be dominated by the subject of religious ritual, instead
of Islam as a religion that offers solutions for the issues faced by the humankind. This
backdrop may have driven South Kalimantan society being less critical to local government
(discussed in Chapter Eight), as the society was not nurtured with a scholarly tradition that
encouraged people being critical and active in overseeing what had been done by
government as suggested by Qur’an12
The next section will describe accountability system including its reporting during
the Yudhoyono government.

4.6. The Accountability System and Reporting under the Yudhoyono Administration
In 2004, Yudhoyono became the first Indonesian president to be directly elected by
the people. Therefore, it is interesting to know what his government has contributed,
particularly in the context of long-time disregard of the public as an audience for localgovernment accountability reports.
Following the passing of Law No. 17 (2003) under the Megawati administration,
the Yudhoyono government endorsed Government Regulation (GR) No. 24 (2005) on
Governmental Accounting Standards (Standar Akuntansi Pemerintahan). The important

12

Qur’an is Muslims’ holy book.
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feature of GR No. 24 (2005) is the provision of detailed procedures for recording
government agencies’ transactions in a new system called cash towards accrual basis
accounting. The system does not yet fully embrace full accrual basis in which revenues,
expenditures and expenses are recorded on a cash basis while assets, liabilities and equities
are recorded on an accrual basis (hence the term cash towards accrual basis). The transition
to a full accrual basis was a gradual process, with full implementation planned by 2008.
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter Two, in 2004 the Megawati administration
also issued Law No. 32 on Local Government. According to this law, local government
must submit three kinds of accountability reports annually: Laporan Penyelenggaran
Pemerintah Daerah (LPPD) or the Implementation of Governance of Local Government
Report, the Laporan Keterangan Pertanggungjawaban Kepala Daerah (LKPj) or the
Explanatory Report on Accountability) and the Informasi Laporan Penyelenggaran
Pemerintah Daerah (ILPPD) or Information on the Implementation of Governance of Local
Government Report. The LPPD is rendered to the central government, while the LKPj is
submitted to the local parliament. The local governments should make the ILPPD available
in the public sphere.
In 2007, the Yudhoyono administration issued Government Regulation (GR) No. 3
on Accountability Reporting of Local Governments. This regulation provided guidance on
the mechanism and contents of local-government accountability reporting. It should be
noted that GR No. 3 provides for an accountability forum in which the power-holder is held
accountable by another party. However, this accountability forum is only implemented at
the level of the local parliament.
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As mentioned earlier, local governments’ accountability reports are classified into
three types: the LPPD, LKPj and ILPPD. The LPPD (rendered to the central government)
has three notable aspects: decentralised functions, consisting of obligatory functions
(urusan wajib)13 and optional functions (urusan pilihan)14; assistance tasks (tugas
pembantuan); and general administration tasks (tugas umum pemerintahan).
Assistance tasks are assigned by the central government to provincial or other lower
government units. General administration tasks cover areas such as inter-local government
cooperation, cooperation with third parties, coordinating with central government offices in
provinces or districts, disaster prevention and mitigation and public order.
The LKPj (submitted to the local parliament) consists of the same contents as the
LPPD, with the addition of two other aspects: the general direction of the local
government’s policies and a general explanation of the local government’s financial
management (article 18).
The ILPPD (made available to the public) essentially summarises the LPPD (article
27). However, GR No. 3 (2007) does not clearly specify which key information or data the
report should contain. It is true that GR No. 3 asserts that citizens are the party to whom
local governments should be accountable. However, the fact that the ILLPD report is only a
13

Obligatory functions include: education, healthcare, environmental sustainability, civil works, spatial
planning, development planning, housing, youth and sport nurturing, cooperatives and small and medium
enterprises, population and civil registration, labour affairs, food self-sufficiency, women’s empowerment and
child protection, family planning and family prosperity, transportation, communication and information, land
administration, nationalism and home political affairs, local autonomy, general administration, localgovernment financial management, local administration, village community empowerment, social and cultural
affairs, local archives system and library.
14
Optional functions encompass maritime and fisheries affairs, agriculture, forestry, energy and mineral
resources, tourism, manufacturing, trading, and transmigration.
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summary of the LPPD could suggest that among the three parties— the central government,
local parliament and citizens— the last could be considered the least important. This is
paradoxical, because people directly elect the heads of local governments, yet when it
comes to the local governments’ accountability reports the public or citizen can only access
limited information.
To recap, the two main provisions governing the accountability reports of local
government, Law No. 32 (2004) and GR No. 3 (2007), have marked a new milestone in
explicitly considering citizens as the new audience of the reports. As a consequence, local
governments’ accountability reports must be submitted to the central government (LPPD)
and the provincial parliament (LKPj), and made available to citizens (ILLPD). However,
among the three parties, citizens only receive limited information, since the accountability
report that can be accessed by the public is only a summary of that submitted to the central
government.

4.7. South Kalimantan Provincial Government
This section describes the history and organisational culture and structure of the
South Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG).
4.7.1. History of the SKPG
The history of the SKPG dates back to about the fifth century A.D., when Tanjung
Puri Kingdom (also called the Kingdom of Kahuripan) established itself at the base of the
Meratus Mountains. Following the migration of a number of Javanese people to Tanjung
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Puri Kingdom, a mixed society was formed incorporating both natives and immigrants. The
descendants of this mixed society were then renamed the Negara Dipa Kingdom.
In the 16th century, the Negara Dipa Kingdom was conquered by the Banjarmasin
Sultanate (Hawkins, 2000); this made the Banjarmasin Sultanate the sole ruling power in
the South Kalimantan region. The sultanate’s base on the banks of Kuwin River, a gateway
for inter-island shipping through the Java Sea, led to its becoming a major maritime
kingdom; this pre-eminence lasted until the late 17th century, when the Dutch colonial
government conquered the Banjarmasin Sultanate. The South Kalimantan people gained
independence from the Dutch colonial government after about 200 years.
An example of the importance that cultural symbols hold for the people of this
region is the esteem given to Pangeran Antasari (died 1862), an independence fighter and
the leader of the struggle against the Dutch. He and other independence heroes exhibited a
spirit of independence locally known as "Waja Sampai Kaputing" (struggling for the sake
of the people with all our might). When Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17
August, 1945, Ir. Pangeran Muhammad Noor was appointed as the first governor of
Kalimantan (Borneo) on 2 September, 1945. Furthermore, emergency Law No. 25 (1956)
and Law No. 21 (1957) divided Kalimantan into four provincial administrations: the South
Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan.
4.7.2. Organisational Culture of the SKPG
According to Oxford advanced learner's dictionary (2010), the term culture
originates from French and is defined as "the belief and attitudes of about something that
people in a particular group or organisation share". In a similar vein, Sparrow (2001, p.83)
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defined culture as "a force that guides the actions of its members during both regular and
irregular situations. Kendall (2011,p.72) offers a clearer definition that "Culture is the
knowledge, language, values, customs, and material objects that are passed from person to
person and from one generation to the next in a human group or society". According to
Kendall (2011), culture is constituted by three elements: ideas, behaviour, and material
possessions, while society is constituted by people. Both society and culture are mutually
dependent (Kendall, 2011); meaning that people is the key actor that shape or be shaped by
culture.
Lundberg (2001, p. 330) offers a definition of organisational cultures as “an
organized set of ideas that draws attention to the phenomenon of observable patterned
behavior (activities and events) and gives them meaning”. Schermerhorn, Jr. et al. (2010,

p.12) defined organisational culture as “a shared set of beliefs and values within an
organization”. Instead of defining organisational culture, Schein (2004) highlights the

concept of culture, because one person's definition might be different to another's due to the
pluralism of beliefs and values embraced by each person or society. Schein (2004) divides
culture into three different levels based on to what extent culture could be visibly observed:
artefacts; espoused beliefs and values; and basic assumptions. Artefacts are the tangible and
visible products production of society or organisation, and can include symbols, logos,
banners, organisational charters and organisational structure (Schein, 2004, pp. 25-26).
Moving into a less tangible level, espoused beliefs and values deal with "what ought to be";
they guide the members of the organisation, articulating "what is right or wrong, what will
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work or not work" (Schein, 2004, p. 28). Basic assumptions form when "a solution to a
problem works repeatedly, it comes to be taken for granted" (Schein, 2004, p. 30).
Inspired by the South Kalimantan heroes of the struggles against Dutch colonial
rule, the SKPG adopted their slogan "Waja Sampai Kaputing" (struggling for the sake of
the people with all our might), as its motto. The basic assumptions implied by adopting
their slogan includes the idea that while struggle can last hundreds of years it can still bear
fruit; and that whatever the outcome, the struggle itself is noble. Over time, these basic
assumptions were repeatedly institutionalised in the society.
For example, the slogan "Waja Sampai Kaputing" appears in the symbol of the
SKPG (Figure 4.2); this symbol is incorporated in the uniforms of the SKPG’s staff and
officials as a way of linking them with their heritage and motivating them to perpetuate the
legacy of the heroes’ struggle, even in their day-to-day activities. This could take the
specific form of providing services to the people of South Kalimantan, and thus bringing
about a more just and prosperous society.
Figure 4.2. Symbol of the SKPG
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For its espoused beliefs and values, the SKPG has adopted five elements:
nationalism, honesty, fairness, discipline and professionalism. As part to institutionalise
these espoused beliefs and values, all SKPG offices display banners that spell them out in
each work unit. It is aimed at reminding the members of organisation how they should
behave with both the people and their colleagues.
Thus, there is evidence that the SKPG has, in fact, instituted the three elements of
organisational culture: artefacts; espoused beliefs and values; and basic assumptions. To
what level or degree these elements have been practiced, rather than just publicly espoused,
is elaborated in the Chapter Seven.
4.7.3. Structure of the SKPG
The provincial government is led by a governor, who is assisted by a vice-governor.
Both the governor and vice-governor are directly elected as regulated by Law No. 32
(2004). There are 74 work units, called Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (SKPD). Each
work unit is led by a head, who is responsible to the governor. According to South
Kalimantan Province Gubernatorial Decree No. 042 (2009), the main tasks of the provincial
secretary are to assist the governor in formulating policies and to coordinate the work units.
The provincial secretary is assisted by three deputies and nine works units (Bureaus).
Figure 4.3 shows the structure of the SKPG.
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Figure. 4.3. Structure of the SKPG
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Two bureaus under the provincial secretary, the Bureau of Governance and Bureau
of Finance, are involved in preparing accountability reports. Reports on non-financial
matters are prepared by the Monitoring and Governance Evaluation Division under the
Bureau of Governance. Financial reporting is managed by the Accounting Division under
the Bureau of Finance. To prepare accountability reports, the SKPG has formed a task
force. The secretariat of the task force is based within the Monitoring and Governance
Evaluation Division. (Chapter Seven describes the preparation of accountability reports in
more detail.)

4.8. Conclusion
The Government of South Kalimantan Province, one of the 33 provinces under the
Republic of Indonesia, has historical roots in the long-running war for Indonesian
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independence. The SKPG aims to institutionalise assumptions based on this struggle,
particularly "Waja Sampai Kaputing" (struggling for the sake of the people with all our
might) as its organisational culture. This is supposed to foster a strong belief that highlymotivated and ceaseless efforts will bear fruit, and that whatever challenge the SKPG faces,
its members can cope with it and bring the people they serve into a just and prosperous
society.
This study also has been contextualised in terms of the socio-political legacies of
the Soeharto regime (Chapter Three) and South Kalimantan history; this includes relevant
cultural observations such as the important role played by religious leaders and the cultural
value placed on the idea of noble and valiant struggle to achieve independence. The details
of South Kalimantan Provincial Government structures have also been presented. The next
chapter discusses the theoretical framework used in this study.
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5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for this study, drawing on
institutional theory. In a study investigating a governmental organisation, Fogarty (1996)
maintained that institutional theory can shed light on this area. Institutional theory
emphasises how an organisation secures institutional legitimacy through conformity to the
prevailing institutions (Fogarty, 1996). Similarly, Scapens (1994) noted that institutional
theory can be employed to understand accounting practices since the theory can provide
insights concerning the interplay between accounting and the institutions, in which it
operates.
This chaper is organised into ten sections: institutional theory (section 5.2);
legitimacy as an essential concept (section 5.3); institutions and the mechanism of
institutionalisation (section 5.4); strategic responses to institutional processes (section 5.5);
some shortcomings of institutional theory (section 5.6); the problematic but useful
decoupling concept (section 5.7); theory of power as a complementary theory (section 5.8);
the research framework (section 5.9); and conclusion (section 5.10).

5.2. Institutional Theory
According to Scott (2001), the existence of institutional theory can be traced back to
the late 19th to mid-20th century. Economists, political scientists and sociologists have
actively contributed to developing this theory. Recent developments have introduced
81

Chapter Five

various approaches among institutional theorists (Scott, 2005a). Economists, for example,
use regulative-element approaches; political scientists and a small number of sociologists
stress normative approaches; while sociologists and cultural-anthropologists favour
cultural-cognitive approaches (Scott, 2005a).
Institutional theory started to draw academics’ attention when Meyer and Rowan
(1977) and Zucker (1977) published their works. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977),
the existence of formal organisational structures is a manifestation of rationalised
institutional rules. They explained that institutional rules such as myths and symbols are
important, as it is through them that organisations obtain resources and legitimacy as well
as maintain their existence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Zucker (1987) asserted that
organisational structures come not only from external pressures but also from internal
interactions within organisation itself. Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977; 1987)
agreed that formal organisational structures and behaviour are the outcomes of values and
beliefs prevalent in the society. Their works paved the way for the emergence of the new
institutional theorists such as W. Richard Scott, Paul J. DiMaggio, Walter W. Powell and
Timothy J Fogarty. Scott and Meyer (1992) argued that “organizations are embedded in
larger systems of relation” (p.150). These systems lie in the societal level that encompasses
non-local, vertical chains of command and horizontal and public-level systems (Scott &
Meyer, 1992).
This is congruent with the nature of governmental organisations, which commonly
exercise their coercive power by imposing regulations (Scott, 2008). Christensen et al.
(2007, p. 69) note that “public organisations as “arenas for exercising power, negotiating
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alliances and coping with conflict”. Accounting, for instance, is employed by organisations
in part to secure legitimacy. This practice then brings accounting closer with politics: “the
language of politics is seen written largely in a language of accounting” (Watkins &
Arrington, 2007, p. 55). Covalesky and Dirsmith (1990, p. 546) had a similar standpoint
saying that “…accounting appears to serve several technical, political and symbolic roles,
and within the symbolic role, at multiple levels (for example, internal-external
representation, intentional political advocacy...)…” Therefore, the new institutional theory
can be instrumental compass in addressing research questions raised by this study.
In relation to the first research question: How does local government prepare its
annual accountability reports? the theory highlights the role of socio-political context in
affecting and shaping the practice of accounting (including accountability). While in the
second research question: How does local parliament use the accountability forum to
evaluate the annual accountability report submitted by local government? the new
institutional theory can shed light on how accounting is employed in political arena, does
accounting merely serve as symbolic role in overseeing executives or accounting has been
used as a rational and technical device in assessing local-government accountability reports.
Hopwoood (1976) who maintained the importance of conducting research in which
accounting is viewed as both an organisational and a social phenomenon. Hopwood (1983)
also stressed that accounting should be studied in the context where it exists: because
organisations are embedded in a particular environment, the interaction between
organisations and their environment is evident. Weber (1978), for instance, noted that
accounting is a product of profit-seeking rationality driven by the spirit of capitalism, and
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deeply rooted in shared cultural and religious beliefs and norms. This view was also shared
by Meyer (1986, p.345) who wrote, “Accounting work is seen related to the expansion of
cultural rationalization”. Mouritsen (1994, p. 196) had a similar standpoint regarding the
interplay between organisations and their environment, writing that "accounting operates in
complex institutional settings where the location and context of social interaction is
important for explaining and understanding it". Therefore, it is apparent that organisations
do not exist in a vacuum; rather they operate and interact with environments characterised
by particular political, cultural and religious values as well as shared beliefs.

5.3. Legitimacy as an Essential Concept
The work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) reflected that legitimacy is the essential
concept in new institutional theory. This view is also shared by DiMaggio and Powell
(1983), Fogarty (1996), Deephouse and Suchman (2008) and Clegg (2010). According to
Meyer and Rowan (1977), organisations pay close attention to legitimating external
institutions upon which they depend, rather than pursuing organisational effectiveness in
achieving their objectives. Embracing the prevailing institutions can give an organisation
legitimacy, through which it can enhance its own survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and
gain resources and social approval (Oliver, 1991).
Scott (1995, p.45) noted that "legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or
exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance
with relevant rules or laws". While the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) paved the way for
the development of new institutional theory, it did not clearly define legitimacy. Thornton
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and Ocasio (2008, p.100) noted that as part of the notion of legitimacy, "parts of
organizations had to be loosely coupled from their technical core". The practice of loose

coupling happens because organisations should align themselves with the external
environment's expectations through which legitimacy is obtained. Suchman (1995, p.574)
offered a more holistic definition:
"Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions".

Two notable features are embodied in Suchman's (1995) definition: first, it conveys a clear
message that organisations should conform their formal structures to prevailing beliefs and
values. Second, it assumes that legitimacy is a socially constructed reality, a view shared by
Deephouse and Suchman (2008). This means that actors play an important role in creating
the desired reality through collective actions as suggested by Selznick (1949, 1996) and
Scott (1987). The actors can then direct the course of organisational activities and programs
in a way that meets social expectations (Fogarty, 1992). Charities, for instance, may be part
of organisational programs intended to enhance their organisational legitimacy in the eyes
of the public, as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Galaskiewicz (1985).

5.4. Institutions and the Mechanism of Institutionalisation
There is not one single definition of the concept “institution”; institutional theorists
have proposed several. Veblen (1899), for instance, wrote:
Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances
and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present (cited in
Chavance, 2009, p.11)
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Hamilton (1932) proposed this definition:
A way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people (cited in Burns,
2000, p. 571).

In a similar vein, North (2003, p.23) maintained that institutions are:
[t]he rules of the games of the society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction.

Scott (2001, p. 48) went further, noting that:
Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience and
are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that,
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to
social life (p.48)

Furthermore, Scott (2001) argued that institutions are instilled into members of a
society by a variety of transmitters such as symbolic systems, relational systems, routines
and artefacts. This idea is line with some scholars, such as Meyer and Rowan (1977),
Weber (1978), Meyer (1986), Carruthers and Espeland (1991) and DiMaggio and Powell
(1983), who viewed accounting as being more than merely a rational tool, as its practices
are influenced by and embedded in the social-relations context (Meyer and Rowan, 1977);
accounting in this context functions not only as a rational tool but also as symbol and myth
(Weber, 1978; Meyer, 1986, Carruthers & Espeland, 1991). These broader functions of
accounting are intended to secure social legitimacy by embracing institutionalised norms,
rules and values (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Organisations, for
instance, have a tendency to imitate their society’s prevailing institutionalised norms, rules
and values.
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The ways in which organisations have a tendency toward homogeneity, so that there
is no contradiction between the exterior and interior of the organisation and its values
(Carruthers, 1995), is called isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) divided this into two types: competitive and institutional. Competitive
isomorphism closely relates to efficiency, in which competition will lead organisations to
achieve their best performance. In contrast, institutional isomorphism has to do with how
rationalised (that is, successful) procedures spread from one (successful) organisation to
another. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) put more emphasis on institutional isomorphism, for
which they specified three mechanisms: coercive isomorphism, mimetic and normative
isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism stems from external pressures that result when organisations
depend on other organisations or parties (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Government
mandates, state-sponsored legitimacy and more-subtle and less-explicit political
mechanisms could be considered to be at the boundaries of coercive isomorphism
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The degree to which an organisation has to conform to the
dictates of a superior organisation range from collaboration through encouragement and,
ultimately, force. Similarly, Scott (2001) noted that coercive isomorphism consists of force,
fear and expedience. Local governments, for instance, are subject to the national
government’s regulations as well as prevailing social norms and cultural expectations
(Scott, 2001). Carruthers (1995) likewise argued that the isomorphism process not only
involves political mechanisms, but also has to do with cultural conformity. Meyer and
Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Carruthers (1995), however, admitted that
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conformity to this pressure appears to be a ceremonial or ritual process rather than
organisations’ pursuit of efficiency and performance.
Mimetic isomorphism takes place when organisations encounter uncertain
conditions and seek a good model by following in the footsteps of successful organisations
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983). An example is Japan’s modernisation of its governance based
on other successful governments in the late 19th century, when it sent officers to study
France’s judicial and security system; the UK’s defence and postal system; and art and
banking in the US (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) posited two
factors that might prompt an organisation to emulate the successful ones: the organisation’s
goals seem to be uncertain; and symbolic uncertainty prevails in the organisation’s
environment. In a similar vein, Scott (2001) asserted that the measures taken by an
organisation to mimic other, efficacious organisations are done to be perceived as a
successful, and thus to secure legitimacy in the public eye. This situation leads to the
process where mimetic isomorphism tends to be more symbolic than actual. Mouritsen
(1994) called this situation “window-dressing”. In a similar vein, Carruthers (1995) noted
that actual organisational decision-making is decoupled from real practices because the
organisation chooses those measures that will make it look good, rather than pursuing
organisational performance and efficiency.
Normative isomorphism is built upon the notion that organisational change is
achieved through the professionalism process. There are two main contributors to
normative isomorphism: formal education and research-based products from by
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authoritative experts; and professional networks that share the latest developments of
science and technology (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).
After accomplishing a certain degree of training, members of an organisation
attempt to implement the best practices in dealing with issues their organisation faces. In
the accounting context, accounting professionals not only apply a number of techniques and
methods in their own organisations, but contribute to an international accounting body,
such as the International Accounting Standards Board. Some countries inclusion in their
reporting of particular economic and social indicators such as gross domestic product, life
expectancy, school enrolment, endangered species and welfare expenditures, for instance,
are examples of the accounting and related professional associations’ contributions to
accountability reporting (Jang, 2005).
Carpenter and Feroz (1992) shared a similar view after investigating four state
governments in the US. They noted that accounting associations such as the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Government Finance Officers Association
played key roles in adopting the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Neu (1991) pointed out that Western societies regard the public-accountant
profession positively, as shown by putting their trust in the accountants' work. Therefore,
the diffusion of institutional isomorphism through normative isomorphism could be
considered better than other isomorphism, as normative isomorphism is built upon
professional values.
The next section depicts the strategic responses that organisations may employ in
responding to institutional processes.
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5.5. Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes
Institutional theory is perceived to have drawbacks regarding its assumptions:
specifically, organisational passivity and the absence of a strategic response in dealing with
institutional pressures (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Perrow, 1985). The assumptions are
deeply rooted on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967) which stressed the importance
of an organisation’s embracing prevailing norms and taken-for-granted institutional rules in
return for legitimacy from the wider society.
However, the development of institutional theory has led to the notion of viewing
organisations as active, not passive, actors. Theorists such as Child (1972), Scott (1991),
Oliver (1991) and Carruthers (1995) are the proponents of this notion. Child (1972) argued
that an active response in an organisation could be observed by analysing the strategic
choice through which the organisation deals with environmental pressures. Child (1972)
even asserted that strategic choice is an essential element for an organisation. Scott (1991,
p. 170) shared this view, saying: “organizations are not passive actors being imprinted by
cultural templates”. Scott (1991) argued that the fact that cultures are not homogenous leads
to an organisation being more active in exercising the appropriate measures of its
organisational structure.
Furthermore, Scott (1991) maintained that the existence of multiple cultural systems
inspires organisations to generate cultural autonomy by establishing a culturally legitimated
template. In the accounting context, Carruthers (1995) argued that the active roles of
organisations can be recognised by their strenuous involvement in shaping rationalised
myths for achieving their purposes.
90

Chapter Five

Oliver (1991) published her seminal work regarding various strategic responses that
organisations exhibit in dealing with institutional pressures for conformity. By bringing
together the insights of institutional and resource-dependency theory, she (1991) revealed
how organisational behaviour might show a variety of responses from passive conformity
to active refusal, subject to the organisational characteristics and prevailing pressures. She
puts forward five strategic responses to institutional processes: acquiescence, compromise,
avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Strategic Reponses to Institutional Processes
Strategies
Acquiescence

Compromise

Avoid

Defy

Manipulate

Tactics

Examples

Habit

Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms

Imitate

Mimicking institutional models

Comply

Obeying rules and accepting norms

Balance

Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents

Pacify

Placating and accommodating institutional elements

Bargain

Negotiating with institutional stakeholders

Conceal

Disguising conformity

Buffer

Loosening institutional attachments

Escape

Changing goals, activities or domains

Dismiss

Ignoring explicit norms and values

Challenge

Contesting rules and requirements

Attack

Assaulting the sources of institutional press

Co-opt

Importing influential constituents

Influence

Shaping values and criteria

Control

Dominating institutional constituents and process
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Source: Oliver (1991), p. 152.

Acquiescence, the most passive response among the five, consists of three forms:
habit, imitate and comply (Oliver, 1991). Examples of habit, which is generally formed in
the context of long-standing and repeated tradition preserved by society, include
unconscious or blind adherence and the persistence of taken-for-granted rules or values.
Imitation has to do with mimetic isomorphism, and is manifest when, for example,
organisations demand legitimacy in the public eye by following other successful
organisations, or by hiring consulting firms to help them cope with their issues (Oliver,
1991). Compliance is defined as the deliberate adherence to the prevailing norms, values or
prescribed institutions in an attempt to deal with environmental complexities (Oliver,
1991).
The second strategic response, compromise, may take place within situations in
which institutional demands collide with the organisations' objectives, particularly their
efficiency policies (Oliver, 1991). Compromise may appear in the form of balancing,
pacifying or bargaining. Balancing relates to taking into account various institutional
demands in response to institutional pressures to achieve equality among existing
stakeholders. Pacifying refers to the tendency to adapt to most of the institutional pressures
on the one hand, while refusing to adapt to the rest on the other hand. Bargaining, a more
active tactic than balancing and pacifying, is used by organisations when they demand
concessions in exchange for their adhering to external organisations’ expectations.
Government agencies, for instance, require commercial enterprises to fulfil minimum
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services standards. These enterprises make agreements among involved parties such as
government agencies, constituent unions and consumer-advocate associations regarding
acceptable services, accountability and output.
Avoidance is a strategy to prevent the need for adherence by employing three forms
of tactics: concealment, buffering and escape (Oliver, 1991). Concealment refers to hiding
non-conformity behind a façade of acquiescence. Buffering reduces the degree to which
inspection, scrutiny and evaluation are internally conducted and partially separates the
organisation’s technical activities from outside. Escape takes a more active response than
either concealment or buffering. It may appear in two forms: organisations can stand
outside the realm in which institutional pressures for conformity are exercised; or modify
their own goals, activities or domain to keep away from the compulsion to comprehensively
conform (Oliver, 1991).
Defiance is considered a more active strategy than the previous three, and may
involve three forms of tactics: dismissal, challenge and attack (Oliver, 1991). Dismissal is a
tactic in which organisations do not pay attention to institutional rules. It is most likely to
take place when organisations consider institutional rules to have a low degree of
importance or when organisational objectives are considered incompatible with institutional
rules. Challenge, a more aggressive tactic than dismissal, is when organisations question
the institutional pressures imposed on them by showing their rational consideration.
Moving on to a still more active tactic, attack may take the form of striking against and
disparaging the institutional pressures prevalent in the society.
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Lastly, manipulation, the most active strategy, involves actively changing or
exercising force over the demands imposed on them (Oliver, 1991). Organisations seeking
to manipulate external pressure may decide to co-opt, influence or control. Co-option could
occur, for example, by persuading institutional constituents to get involved in the
organisations’ activities or to become a member of its executive. Influence might be
displayed by an organisation in directing values and beliefs prevalent in society to align
with the organisation’s preferences. Control is a tactic in which organisations employ
particular measures to exercise power over the institutional constituents that are imposing
demands or expectations on them. The following section presents some shortcomings of
institutional theory.

5.6. Institutional Theory: Some Shortcomings
Institutional theory is not free from criticism. As presented previously, institutional
theory can be divided into two streams: old and new. New institutional theory underpins its
assumptions on culture being more important than power. Brint and Karabel (1991) and
Clegg (2010) criticised this assumption and argued that it has led to the role of power in
institutional processes being neglected in favour of cultural domination (Brint & Karabel,
1991). Furthermore, some commentators such as Perrow (1985), Powell (1985), and
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) have offered the critique that institutional theory has paid
little attention to the role of organisational self-interest and active agency in dealing with
the institutional pressures and expectations they face.
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Lawrence (2008) acknowledges the critique that in the early development of
institutional theory (the 1970s and 1980s), institutional scholars did not pay much attention
to the role of power, and focused more on institutions as embodiment of myth and
ceremony. Lawrence (2008) further notes that more recent developments in institutional
theory have addressed such criticism, taking power and political issues into account (see
Oliver, 1991; Carpenter & Feroz, 1992; Amenta & Halfmann, 2000; Bartley & Schneiberg,
2002). Researchers realised that institutions and institutional changes could be better
comprehended by incorporating power and political aspects into consideration of
institutional aspects. This is congruent with Clegg (2010, p. 11), who asserted that "the
concept of power is absolutely central to any understanding of society". In a similar vein,
DiMaggio (1988) wrote that institutionalisation is a political process through which
organisational actors play the key roles in achieving particular results (cited in Powell,
2007) and preserving prevailing rules, norms and meaning (Sewell, 1992). Coercive
isomorphism, for instance, could be conducted only if three elements exist: political
pressures, the force of state and a number of regulations (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983). Thus,
without actors, the institutionalisation process will not occur. Furthermore, DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) asserted that influential professional elites play an important role in diffusing
certain standards to members of organisations. However, Mizruchi and Fein (1999)
contended that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) put aside power by placing coercive
isomorphism and normative isomorphism behind mimetic isomorphism in importance. This
discourse emerged as a response to new institutional theory’s emphasising the macro level
(as part of a wider environmental context) as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977), rather
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than the micro level (a within organisation context). To deal with this shortcoming,
institutional research can be directed to capture both the macro and micro levels, as
institutionalisation should be perceived as a process rather than a condition, as suggested by
Zucker (1991).
With regard to the criticism raised by Perrow (1985), Powell (1985) and Covaleski
and Dirsmith (1988), Oliver (1991) argued that institutional theory can shed light on how
organisations strategically respond to the institutional pressures and expectations they face.
Organisations can adapt and manage their organisational response from passive to active
behaviour that ranges from acquiescence through compromise, avoidance, defiance and
manipulation (the most active response) (Oliver 1991), depending on the choices of
organisational actors engaging, modifying and selecting the appropriate response in dealing
with their organisation’s institutional pressures (Amenta & Halfmann, 2000; Bartley &
Schneiberg, 2002; Clegg, 2010).
Another issue concerning new institutional theory is the fact that it is built upon the
concepts of stability and order (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This in
turn leads to the notion that new institutional theory denies change since it may bring
organisations into instability and disorder. Scott (2008), however, argued that institutional
change could take place within organisations, for either external or internal reasons.
Political, economic and social factors at the macro (external) level can prompt institutional
changes. Moreover, institutional change such as initiatives to improve poor performance in
dealing with constituents’ expectations can happen from within an organisation.
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Although institutional theory has some shortcomings, the relatively recent
development of institutional theory has paid attention to such issues and addressed them.
The next section describes the concept of decoupling that happens in an institutionalised
environment.

5.7. The Problematic but Useful Concept of Decoupling
Meyer and Rowan (1977) asserted that in modern societies, formal organisational
structures came into existence in a highly institutionalised context. In this context,
accounting is one of the parts of formal organisational structures. This leads to the notion
that the interplay between accounting and its organisational and social context is important,
as noted by several authors (see Hopwood, 1976; Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1983).
This interplay leads to a positive impact for organisations by providing a source of
legitimacy for them to continue their activities (Fogarty, 1992).
Meyer and Rowan (1977) maintain that organisations have been pressured to
integrate prevailing rationalised frameworks of organisational work and institutionalised
beliefs, norms and practices prevalent in the society in which they operate. In a similar
vein, Carruthers (1995) states that to obtain more legitimacy, organisations have to operate
within their cultural context. Operating within these constraints generally constitutes an
attempt to be “seen” as being able to convey social expectation (Fogarty, 1992) by
ceremonially adopting institutionalised services, products, techniques, policies and
programs that function as powerful myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Organisations shape their “good” image by exercising institutionalised programs to
attract and impress people within the society. Loans, donations and investment programs,
for instance, are offered to the society in return for legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
However, this adoption brings consequences, in that organisations experience
decoupling or loose coupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Orton & Weick, 1990): a deviation
between what organisations actually do and what given the formal organisational structure,
they should do (Fogarty, 1992). In other words, what organisations do tends to bear only a
loose resemblance to their official role. As a result, they neglect the principles of efficiency
and effectiveness (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987; Mouritsen, 1994).
Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 357) described the decoupling process:
Activities are performed beyond the purview of managers. In particular,
organizations actively encourage professionalism, and activities are delegated to
professionals. Goals are made ambiguous or vacuous, and categorical ends are
substituted for technical ends. Hospitals treat, not cure, patients. Schools produce
students, not learning. In fact, data on technical performance are eliminated or
rendered invisible. Hospitals try to ignore information on cure rates, public services
avoid data about effectiveness, and schools deemphasize measures of
achievement. Integration is avoided, program implementation is neglected, and
inspection and evaluation are ceremonialized.

Decoupling also causes accounting to become less associated with the operational
aspects of an organisation, even though it is widely perceived as a source of rational models
to support decision-making (Carruthers, 1995). Mouritsen (1994) similarly asserted that
managers abuse accounting to obscure what organisations actually do, and to distract the
public from irregularities and dissonance. Decoupling or loose coupling takes place because
formal organisational structures serve merely as symbols (Scott, 1987, p. 507) and, more
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particularly, because accounting has come to be a symbolic and ritual display (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Meyer, 1986; Carruthers and Espelands, 1991).
However, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that decoupling can also have
advantages. When prevailing rationalised frameworks of organisational work and
institutionalised beliefs, norms and practices are incorporated into an organisation, this, in
turn, leads to harmony between the organisation and its environment, through which
friction and conflict can be reduced (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Fogarty (1996) added that
loose coupling could help organisations survive despite the constraints of institutional
pressures. Decoupling also allows organisation to live up to various expectations from
diverse constituents (Meyer et al., 1981, cited in Coburn, 2004). Likewise, decoupling has
prompted organisations to be more dynamic in responding to, and selecting the appropriate
strategies in dealing with institutional pressures and environmental uncertainty (Oliver,
1991). The following section describes the nature and interplay of institutional theory with
other theories.

5.8. Theory of Power as a Complementary Theory
Arendt (1958) noted that society could achieve its desired goals by collectively
building a societal capacity among various parties collectively, as individually this may not
be possible. Hardy (1985, p. 385) defined power as “the ability to affect the behaviour of
others in a conscious and deliberate way.” Baum (1989, p. 195) elaborated on this concept:
This power governs a politics concerned with creating new possibilities in a world
where resources may be scarce but some interests may be joined and new
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resources created. This is win-win politics: victory is only collective and one party’s
loss defeats all.

Hardy (1996) wrote that power has a determinant role in organisations by providing
energy for strategic change. The absence of power, and thus the lack of mechanism for
making changes, could paralyse organisations. However, some people loathe and avoid
politics due to the stigma that politics tends to spark conflicts among members of
organisations, while others get involved in the political arena specifically to improve the
organisational situation (Baum, 1989).
According to Baum (1989), organisations have a politics around decisions. Without
politics, desired changes and goals could not be achieved, as politics is a course of action or
behaviour through which power is constructed and employed in an organisational
environment, while power is an authority through which events can be materialised
(Pfeffer, 1981, p. 7)
However, Hardy (1996) critiqued the traditional notions of power that mainly stress
on the mobilisations of resources such as financial support, information and public goods.
In an attempt to redress this traditional notion, Hardy (1996) illustrated the multidimensionality of power, outlining four dimensions: the power of resources, the power of
decision-making, the power of meaning and the power of the system.
For the first, Hardy (1996) suggests that at its early stage, research concerning
power was focused on decision-making and control over limited resources. Hardy (1996)
argued that the behaviour of others should be controlled and directed toward desired goals
by distributing and limiting essential resources on which people rely, such as information,
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skill development, employee promotion, financial control and the reward and punishment
system.
When considering decision-making, Hardy (1996) maintained that one should pay
attention to not only formal decision-making occasions but also the processes behind the
scenes that relate to how decisions are made. By following such processes, one would know
the actors behind the formal and procedural mechanisms, who are usually driven by
political motives. Hardy (1996) further wrote that this dimension could exist within
conformity to the prevailing norms and values.
Hardy's (1996) third dimension, the power of meaning, is closely associated with
symbols, prevailing norms and values to build the society’s perception and cognition
towards the organisation (Hardy, 1996). Through this dimension, organisations create an
image communicating that they conform to the prevailing institutions embraced by society
at large, which in turn gives them legitimacy (Hardy, 1985). Meyer and Rowan (1977)
wrote that institutional rules such as myths and symbols are pivotal, as it is through them
that organisations secure resources and legitimacy.
Finally, according to Hardy (1996), the power of the system is deeply rooted within
the formal structure of organisations. This is the most elusive dimension because every
member of every organisation takes it for granted in the form of unwritten rules and norms
that have existed over time. However, Hardy (1996) opined that managers could adjust this
system to some extent to bring transformational change within organisations. In a similar
vein, Amenta and Halfmann (2000), and Bartley and Schneiberg (2002) maintained that
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organisational actors can modify and select the appropriate response in dealing with their
organisation’s institutional pressures.
Does power theory provide a suitable combination with institutional theory as main
theoretical lens of this study? According to Scott (2005a, p. 408), institutional theory is
underpinned by some core assumptions. Among these is “institution are governance
structures, embodying rules for social conduct”. Arendt (1958) stated that societal capacity
needs to be managed to achieve desired goals; meaning that it requires power to electrify
and mobilise potential elements in the society or organisations to reach their objectives as
suggested by Hardy (1985). The views above display that the two theories seem to be
possible to blend, as the two show no contentious ideas.
Furthermore, Scott (2005a) maintained that institutional theory is not by nature an
individual theory, as the theory can be combined with other theories such as economy,
politics and sociology. Lawrence (2008) noted that combining institutional theory with
power theory is crucial, as it allows researchers to understand how institutions work in the
societal field and their effects to organisations.
Christensen et al. (2007) asserted that public organisations are arenas for exercising
power. Thus, investigating the practice of accountability in the public organisation like the
SKPG through theory of power– as a complementary theory– is essential, as it provides
insights how power exercised by the actors can affect the practice of local-government
accountability reporting.
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5.9. Research Framework
This section describes the research framework that this study employs in analysing
and understanding the practice of the accountability reporting in Indonesian local
governments, particularly in the South Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG).
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Soeharto regime ruled Indonesia for more than
three decades (1967-1998). Under this regime, which was highly centralistic, almost all
aspects of the country and its people’s lives were tightly controlled by the regime. Liddle
(1985, p. 71) illustrated this situation as a follows:
The president commands the military which is primus inter pares within the
bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society. The Indonesian
bureaucracy is powerful in two senses. First, the bureaucracy pervades society. In
every city, town, and village it is the largest employer. Its schools unlock the door to
the modern, supra-village world. Its health centers, banks, agricultural extension
services and marketing agencies, religious affairs offices, and requirement of
personal identity cards make it for better and worse a daily reality which most
Indonesians cannot escape. The scope and weight of this presence are
comparable to Communist countries…

The Soeharto regime also exercised powerful control over the practice and formal
procedures of state organisations. The practice of accounting and auditing, for instance, was
merely a symbol of rational behaviour and accountability, rather than a series of substantive
efforts to improve and support public organisations in pursuing their tasks and functions.
Under these circumstances, accounting and auditing practices became merely a symbolic
display or legitimising device rather than a set of tools to allow public organisations to be
accountable and transparent. This is consistent with claims made by Covaleski et al. (1996)
that accounting practices in organisations might serve a ceremonial function and
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symbolically show the organisations' commitment to the public, rather than constituting a
real commitment.
The Soeharto regime was replaced after public discontent in 1998. Although the
regime collapsed more than a decade ago, its legacies persist, as discussed in Chapter
Three, and influence local governments across Indonesia, including the practice of localgovernment accountability reporting (discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight).
Indonesia then entered a new era, popularly known as the "reform era" (era
reformasi) (Ricklefs, 2001). The Habibie administration, for instance, took significant
measures by devolving more authority onto local governments under the umbrella of Law
No. 22 (1999) on Local Government and Law No. 25 (1999) on Fiscal Decentralisation and
Revenue Sharing. This change from an authoritarian and centralised regime to a democratic
and decentralised government system in 1999 may have affected the practice of
accountability, including the accountability system of local government.
As discussed in Chapter 1, during the Soeharto regime, the accountability system of
local government including its reporting system was designed to be more accountable to the
regime (the central government) than to the public; the role of local parliaments as
oversight bodies were also undermined by the regime. In addressing this issue, Law No. 22
(1999) gave greater authority to local parliaments in exercising their supervisory role
through an accountability forum. However, the law still did not recognise the public as the
audience of the local-government accountability reports. It was not until the emergence of
Law No. 32 (2004) and Government Regulation (GR) No. 3 (2007) that the public was
regarded as one of the audience of accountability reports.
104

Chapter Five

According to GR No. 3 (2007), after submitting the accountability report to the
central government and making it available to the public, an actor (governor) has to deliver
the administration's accountability report before an accountability forum held by the
provincial parliament. The members of the provincial parliament will then assess the
accountability report. The arrangement to discharge accountability through a forum is part
of gaining legitimacy through formal procedures, as regulated by the relevant provisions.
This is consistent with the claims made by some scholars that an accountability forum is an
important part of the accountability process through which key actors (Bovens, 2007a,
2007b, 2010; Mulgan, 2000a) can gain legitimacy (Bovens, 2007a, 2007b, 2010).
The local governments, including the SKPG, must comply with the central
government’s changes to the local-government accountability system. Viewed from an
institutional-theory perspective, the SKPG, in acquiescing to the changes made by the
central government, is driven by institutional isomorphism, particularly coercive
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This backdrop may affect the practice of
accountability reporting of local governments across Indonesia, including the SKPG, after
the Soeharto regime, during which the practice of accountability was framed to allow
collusive practices.
This study argues that to secure legitimacy, the SKPG employed a two-pronged
approach that operated simultaneously in the organisational and societal fields. In the
organisational field, the SKPG started to implement and institutionalise the new localgovernment accountability system into its organisational practice, as stipulated by the
relevant laws and regulations, thus securing legitimacy from the central government. This is
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consistent with the claim made by Scott (2001) that local government is subject to the
central government's regulation as well as to certain social norms and expectations. To
quote the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), "the position of dependence" leads the
SKPG to comply with change demanded by the central government. This is confirmed by a
study conducted by Martani and Liestiani (2010), which found that 66.21% of Indonesian
local governments' budget was funded and determined by the central government through
the general allocation fund (DAU, dana alokasi umum). Therefore, in order to get more
resources (including financial support), local governments need to seek greater legitimacy
by acquiescing to the central government’s laws and regulations.
On the societal field, the South Kalimantan society is a relatively religious
community (Daud, 1997; Karni & Hidayat, 2006; Chalmers, 2007). Given this social
setting, the role of religious leaders or gurus is highly important. Moreover, due to their
extensive engagement with the people, their role is even broader, extending not just to
leading religious activities, but to serving as the figures from whom people seek advice
concerning non-religious matters such as how to start up a new business or what to do
before building a new house. Thus, gurus also serve as informal leaders and can influence
and shape the society through their extensive engagement with the people who comprise it.
Informal leaders emerge when a figure without formal power is able to influence the
behaviour of others (Pielstick, 2000; West, 2008; Schermerhorn, Jr. et al., 2010). Some
religious gurus also function as charismatic leaders in the society. According to Bass
(2008), the charisma concept is developed from Weber’s concept, in which charisma is
embedded in theology. Weber (1947) noted that the attribute of extraordinary charisma is
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not granted to a leader by God, but by the leader’s followers. Although Banjarese society
(the majority ethnic group in South Kalimantan) does not recognise "class", gurus
(particularly those who have great numbers of followers) are commonly perceived as
having a special relationship with God, and have been granted high status through a
tradition that goes back many generations. Therefore, it is common in the society that
people pay great respect to and put a high level of trust in gurus.
This is consistent with the claim made by Berger and Luckmann (1991) that social
order is built upon shared social reality through which human society is constructed.
Therefore, the tradition that pays great honour to gurus is a socially-constructed reality,
because this practice has been preserved (Covaleski et al, 1996). Given this prevailing
institution, the actors/elites in the SKPG also pay great respect to, and foster good and close
relationship with, gurus, particularly those having large followings. The SKPG actors also
support traditional religious rites or events conducted by gurus and the society by allocating
funds from the provincial budget for such events. In this way, the elites can be perceived by
the public as sharing similar values with the larger society, and thereby are much more
likely to obtain organisational legitimacy, one of the essential concepts of institutional
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fogarty,
1996; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Clegg, 2010). This is consistent with the claim made
by Fogarty (1992, p.333) that “the way organizations are organized and operate, to the
extent they are visible to the public, are purposely designed to accommodate social
expectations”. Carruthers (1995) supported this idea that organisations secure their
organisational legitimacy by running their programs within the cultural boundaries in which
107

Chapter Five

they operate. Meyer and Rowan (1977) also maintain that in an attempt to obtain
organisational legitimacy, organisations should be directed to integrate the concept of their
organisational work and rules with the institutionalised beliefs, norms and values in the
society.
Based on the discussion of the relevant theories of this study, Figure 5.1. shows the
research framework of this study.
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Figure 5.1. Research Framework of the Study
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5.10. Conclusion
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this study, which draws on
institutional theory as a main theoretical lens, and power and leadership theories as
complementary ones. This study argues that to secure legitimacy, the South Kalimantan
Provincial Government (SKPG) employs a two-pronged approach that extends to the
organisational and societal fields. In the organisational field, the SKPG has begun to
implement and institutionalise the new local-government accountability system into its
organisational practice, as stipulated by the relevant laws and regulations issued by the
central government, and securing legitimacy.
In the societal field, the SKPG employs a different strategy. South Kalimantan is
perceived as a religious society. Given this social setting, the role of religious leaders or
gurus becomes important, because they are actively involved not only in religious services
and events, but as sources of advice for people concerning their daily life issues. Gurus’
importance in the society gives them power to influence the society, including in political
matters. Given this prevailing institution, the actors/elites in the SKPG also pay great
respect to, and foster good and close relationships with, gurus to boost the SKPG’s
legitimacy in the public’s eyes.
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Chapter 6: Research Methodology
6.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the research methodology employed in this study. As
mentioned in the introduction chapter, the objective of this study is twofold: (a) to
understand the practice of accountability reports exercised by Indonesian local government
following the decentralisation reforms; and (b) to understand how local parliament
evaluates the accountability reports submitted by local government. To gain this
understanding and obtain valid knowledge, the philosophical foundations of the research
(ontology, epistemology, methodology, and method) should be well-comprehended and
determined beforehand (Gaffikin, 2008; Bisman, 2010), as consistency among the four
foundation elements is necessary for effective research (Gaffikin, 2008; Bisman, 2010).
The philosophical foundations employed in this study also influence the way data is
gathered and interpreted. The epistemological assumption of qualitative research, for
instance, demands that the researcher is to close to the object being researched.
This chapter is organised into eight sections: the philosophical basis of the study
(section 6.2); case-study research (section 6.3); case-study research design (section 6.4); the
research question (6.5); data collection (6.6); data analysis (6.7) and the conclusion (6.8).

6.2. Philosophical Basis
As stated previously in the Chapter 1, this study has established its ontological and
epistemological assumptions. According to Gaffikin (2008) and Bisman (2010), to obtain
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knowledge, four philosophical foundations should be determined and well understood,
should be consistent with one another, before conducting research: ontology, epistemology,
methodology, and method.
Methodology and method (the third and fourth elements of the philosophical
foundation of research) are frequently misunderstood (Gaffikin, 2008), and often
erroneously considered synonymous (Gaffikin, 2008). Methodology is defined as the
framework of tools employed in securing the knowledge (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998;
Neuman, 2006; Gaffikin, 2008; Silverman, 2001). Gaffikin (2008, p. 7), for instance, said
that "methodology investigates and evaluates methods of inquiry and thus sets the limits of
knowledge", while he defined method as "the technique used to gather the data and
information". Therefore, the method employed depends on, and should be in line with, its
methodology.
In general, there are two research approaches: quantitative and qualitative research.
Quantitative approaches focus on collecting and analysing numeric data of variables being
studied through statistical testing (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005); while
qualitative approaches deal with examining and reflecting on perceptions of sociallyconstructed reality, as well as ensuring closeness between the researcher and the object
being studied (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Qualitative approaches
encompass some research strategies such as phenomenological study, ethnography and the
case study. As such, quantitative research demands that researchers pay attention to the
reliability and validity of the evidence collected (Neuman, 2006; Scapens, 2004). Scapens
(2004, p.268) defined reliability as "the extent to which evidence is independent of the
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person using it", and validity as “the extent to which the data are in some sense a 'true'
reflection of the real world". In other words, validity and reliability demand that the
researcher is both independent and impartial (Scapens, 2004). However, in qualitative
research, particularly case-study research, perfect reliability and validity are essentially
impossible (Scapens, 2004), as they contradict the ontological and epistemological stance
that stresses the importance of researcher’s reflective interpretation over the object being
studied (Scapens, 2004). Thus, this study does not need to employ reliability and validity of
evidence collected as suggested by Scapens (2004).
The research strategy employed in this study is case-study research, for a number of
reasons. Yin (2003) stated that particular conditions determine whether the case study is
appropriate research strategy: (a) the study poses “how” and “why” questions; (b) the
investigator has minor authority over the event; and (c) the focus is on the contemporary
phenomenon within some real-life context (p. 1). As this study meets these criteria, the
case-study approach can be adopted. The next section describes case-study research in
more detail.

6.3. Case Study Research
Creswell (1998) held that the case study is one of five qualitative traditions of
inquiry, the others being biography, phenomenological study, grounded-theory study, and
ethnography. The use of the case study as a research strategy has been employed in a wide
range of disciplines including law, psychology, medicine, politics, history, sociology and
accounting (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Scapens, 2004; Neuman, 2006, Paslawski, 2010).
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In addition to various disciplines, case-study research as a strategy can also be employed to
investigate organisations, events, programs, activities, and societies (Creswell, 1998;
Neuman, 2006).
Theorists seem to largely agree on the definitions of the case study (see Creswell,
1998; Neuman, 2006; Yin, 2003). Creswell (1998, p.61) defined a case study as "an
exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or a case (or multiple-cases) over time through detailed,
in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context". In a
similar vein, Neuman (2006, p.40) defined it as "an in-depth examination of an extensive
amount of information about very few units or cases for one period or across multiple
periods of time". Both these definitions share similar characteristics that require a
researcher to perform a thorough examination and use various sources of information.
Yin (2003, p.13) defined the case-study research strategy as "an empirical enquiry
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Yin (2003)
extended the definition of case study by adding and highlighting one attribute, that the
object being studied is a contemporary phenomenon. Thus, Yin's definition seems to
provide more complete attributes in understanding the material being examined.
Furthermore, Humphrey and Scapens (1996, p.94) supported the use of the case
study in accounting research:
We believe that case studies of accounting practice are a vital, albeit not the only,
way of informing such debate and enhancing understanding of both the day-to-day
organizational complexities of such practices and the interrelated influence of wider
social and political contexts. However, knowledge developed through case studies
will be dependent on the way the cases are constructed and their findings
communicated.
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The advantage of a case study is that it can provide a clearer picture of accounting practice
in relation to its larger social context, as it can connect individual activities at the micro
level to their environmental setting at the macro level (Vaughan, 1992).
Apart from these strengths, a case study as a research strategy also has its
limitations. There is a common criticism that case-study research does not provide a
generalisable conclusion (Hägg & Hedlund, 1979; Tellis, 1997a; Dul & Hak, 2008)
because, unlike a survey, it usually does not employ a larger set of data, instead using one
more cases of the particular phenomena. Case-study research is also criticised because it
cannot test hypotheses (explanatory); rather, it can only generate hypotheses (descriptive)
(Hägg & Hedlund, 1979). Aaltio and Heilmann (2010) argue that the case study is
idiographic in nature and this aids researchers in understanding the object researched within
its particular context. For instance, there is no single worldwide government system;
examples range from autocratic to democratic. Even countries that embrace democratic
system differ significantly in many of their attributes. This is because a single country does
not operate in a vacuum, but exists within particular or distinct social, cultural, political and
economic systems. To force case-study research to produce a generalisable conclusion
could be considered futile, as it goes against the particular nature of qualitative research
itself (Neuman, 2006).
In conclusion, the adoption of the case study as the research strategy of this study is
considered to be appropriate, due to its strength in conveying a holistic and rich
understanding of issues within their environmental setting. It is consistent with the
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objectives of this study, which are to understand and analyse the practice of accountability
reports exercised by Indonesian local governments following decentralisation reform.
The next section will describe the research design of this study

6.4. The Case Study Research Design
Trochim (2006) noted that research design generally serves as guidance that allows
researchers to focus on elements and procedures of research so that they keep focused on
addressing their research questions. According to Yin (2003, p.21), the research design of a
case study involves “five components: (a) a study’s questions, (b) its propositions, if any,
(c) its unit(s) of analysis, (d) the logic linking the data to the prepositions, and (e) the
criteria for interpreting the findings”.
McDonald (2010) asserted that ‘how and why’ are typical questions of case study
research and have been worthwhile to facilitate researchers in achieving their research’s
objectives. Yin (2003) pointed out that propositions, defined by Neuman (2006, p. 58) as "a
theoretical statement about relationship between two or more concepts", are not
compulsory for a case study.
The unit of analysis is “the major entity being analyzed in the study” (Fletcher &
Plakoyiannaki, 2010, p. 838). It can be an individual, a group of individuals (for example a
family or professional association), a social category (such as social class or gender) or an
organisation or individuals within an organisation (Neuman. 2006).
Yin (2003) noted that both the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the
criteria for interpreting the findings components are useful in determining the stage of data
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analysis in

case-study research. Pattern matching is one of analytical tools used in

interpreting and analysing data (Das, 2010). Pattern matching contains “matching an
observed pattern (a pattern of measured values) with an expected pattern (a hypothesis) and
deciding whether these patterns match (resulting in a confirmation of the hypothesis) or do
not match (resulting in a disconfirmation)” (Hak & Dul, 2010, p. 663).
Considering this study does not test hypotheses and the objectives of this study (as
mentioned in Chapter 1), this study does not employ pattern-matching; instead, it uses an
iteratively circular method based on three elements— notice things, collect things, and
think about things— to link data and to interpret findings (Seidel, 1998, p.2). Aaltio and
Heilmann (2010, p. 66) shared that view by saying that:
A researcher and a research object interact constantly with each other in a case
study, and maintaining mutual trust is, therefore, a part of the research process. In
the results, the objective is to understand and interpret thoroughly the individual
cases in their own special context, and to find information concerning the dynamics
and the processes.

The method adopted to interpret the findings will be described in more detail in the section
on data analysis.
In short, the role of research design is vital in guiding and directing the researcher to
address the study’s objective. The next section describes this study’s research questions.

6.5. Research Questions
This study has two research questions as stated in the Chapter 1. According to Yin
(2003, p.22), "the case study strategy is most likely to be appropriate for ‘how’ and ‘why’
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questions”. Thus, research questions posed in this study meet the criterion for using a casestudy strategy.
Considering the nature of qualitative research which relies on interpretive or critical
social science (Neuman, 2006), this study is not intended to examine hypotheses, rather it is
directed to understand the practice of accountability reports as applied by Indonesian local
government as well as the role of local parliament in assessing such report. By doing so,
this study can capture and discover the meaning of such practices within their unique
contexts (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010).
According to Mills et al. (2010) there are three categories of case-study research:
exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Woiceshyn, (2010) noted that exploratory and
descriptive case studies only provide a story and do not offer more explanation related to
substantial factors influencing the object being studied. In a similar vein, Aaltio and
Heilmann (2010) argued that case-study research is not only a description of data, but a
plausible method that employs interpretation and analysis. This study, therefore, attempted
not to stop at exploratory and descriptive case studies, but rather wished to cover the
explanatory area of research as well.
Initially, to carry this study into this explanatory case study category was very
challenging for me. Interpreting and analysing qualitative data, dealing with (typically
abstract) description was not an easy task. The difficulties started to be manageable, when I
wrote the theoretical framework of this study. The framework allowed me to connect the
data collected with relevant theories and everything looked clearer than before. This is
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consistent with the view expressed by Scapens (2004) that a sound theoretical framework
could facilitate researchers in interpreting data collected in a case-study research.
The unit of analysis of this study is the South Kalimantan Provincial Government
(SKPG), while each person within the SKPG being interviewed is treated as a key
informant in the context of the organisation being studied. This approach is supported by
previous case-study research, including Selznick’s (1949) research investigating the
Tennessee Valley Authority, in which the unit of analysis was the organisation itself, and
Rains’s (1984) study of the Boys’ Farm.

6.6. Data Collection
Before data collection could begin, I had to obtain permission to access the South
Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG) office. Six months before the site visit, I
contacted an official within the SKPG via e-mail and telephone. I assumed that permission
would be granted relatively easily, as this process was facilitated by an insider. However,
relying solely on this official was not enough, as the official encountered difficulty in
explaining the nature of this study using an interpretive paradigm (that is, that it depended
on lessening the distance between the researcher and the object of study) to the relevant
authority. The relevant authority within the SKPG could not make a decision whether to
grant permission or not. This occasion confirmed the view articulated by Irvine and
Gaffikin (2006, p. 122) that “negotiating an access agreement is crucial to the success of
the project.”
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Considering this issue, I made a decision to seek permission in person from the
relevant official. Before leaving, I equipped myself with a letter of introduction from my
supervisor. I then conducted a meeting with relevant officials in early September 2008. In
the meeting, I explained the nature of my study to the official so that he could understand
and thereby give permission to access the SKPG office. He then issued a formal letter that
certified me as a student conducting research on the practice of accountability reporting in
the SKPG office from December 2008 to June 2009. From the meeting, I also obtained
quite worthwhile information concerning previous research conducted within the SKPG.
The official told me that the way I proposed to conduct research was very different from
that of previous researchers. The official further explained that these prior researchers had
simply interviewed some relevant informants and collected the data they needed. In
contrast, my study required prolonged engagement in the field to permit direct observations
over time of the phenomena being studied.
In collecting data, researchers can use several possible sources of evidence such as
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation,
and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003; Dul & Hak, 2008; Gillham, 2000; Woodside, 2010). Yin
(2003, p. 86) pointed out that each of these sources has its own strengths and weakness, as
summarised in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1. Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses
Source of Evidence
Documentation*

Strengths
Weaknesses
Stable—can
be
reviewed Retrievability— can be low
Biased selectivity, if collection
repeatedly
Unobtrusive—not created as a is incomplete
Reporting
bias—reflects
result of the case study
Exact—contains exact names, (unknown) bias of author
references, and details of an Access—may be deliberately
event
blocked
Broad coverage—long span of
time, many events, and many
settings
The actions taken at the site:
Collecting internal data from the South Kalimantan Provincial
Government office such as: accountability reports, accounting
policy, organisational structure, provincial parliament's
recommendations. Data from external sources was also gathered,
such as audited financial statements from the Supreme Audit
Agency (BPK), South Kalimantan's statistics from the Indonesian
Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and some clippings of news from
national and local newspapers.

Archival Records*

[Same as for documentation]
Precise and quantitative

Interview*

[Same as e for documentation]
Accessibility due to privacy
reasons
Targeted—focuses directly on Bias due to poorly constructed
case study topic
questions
Insightful—provides perceived Response bias
causal inferences
Inaccuracies due to poor recall
Reflexivity—interviewee gives
what interviewer wants to hear
The actions taken at the site:
Interviewing relevant individuals in order to seek their opinion or
views concerning the practice of accountability reports, as well
as to understand the social context of the research setting. The
individuals come from various positions ranging from highranking to low-ranking officials as well as relevant staff.
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Direct Observations*

Participant-Observation

Physical Artefacts

Reality—covers events in real
time
Contextual—covers context of
event

Time-consuming
Selectivity—unless
broad
coverage
Reflexivity—event
may
proceed differently because it
is being observed
Cost—hours needed by human
observers

The actions taken at the site:
Being immersed in the site for six months by observing the dayto-day activities of accountability reports preparation, to
understand how accountability reports are prepared and who are
the real actors.
[Same
as
for
direct [Same
as
for
direct
observations]
observations]
Insightful into interpersonal Bias due to investigator's
behaviour and motives
manipulation of events.
Insightful into cultural features Selectivity
Insightful
into
technical Availability
operations

Source: Yin (2003, p.86)
* Sources of evidence adopted by this study.

In collecting data, this study uses four sources of evidence: interviews, direct
observations, documentation and archival records. The next sub-sections describe these
sources of evidence in more detail.
6.6.1. Interviews
This study mainly collected data from interviews. Open-ended interviews were
employed during the field research, as suggested by Yin (2003). The open-ended interview
is “a type of survey research question in which respondents are free to offer any answer
they wish to the question” (Neuman, 2006, p. 286). The open-ended interview was chosen
to allow a “free-flowing discussion” during the interview as suggested by Mir and Sutiyono
(2013, p. 107) and Harun and Kamase (2012).
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In recruiting the potential respondents, I began by understanding the process of
preparing local-government accountability report practiced by the SKPG. Under the SKPG,
there are 74 work units (including nine bureaus) called Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah
(SKPD). A task force was formed by the SKPG to collect accountability reports from work
units, which are then compiled into the SKPG accountability reports.
The task force sends a formal request to work units to submit their accountability
reports. Each work unit sends the LPPD and LKPj to the task-force secretariat at the SKPG
Bureau of Governance. The reports are compiled and summarised, and the ILPPD is
generated. The accountability reports are then handed over to the governor as the head of
the South Kalimantan Provincial Government. The reports, subsequently, are submitted to
the three entities: the central government, the provincial parliament and the public, as
shown in the following figure.
Figure 6.1. The Process of Preparing Local-Government Accountability Reports
Requests work units to
submit their respective
accountability report (1)
The SKPG Task
Force for
accountability
reports

Submit the reports requested
(2)

Work units
under
the SKPG

(3)
Filing, compiling
and summarising
accountability
reports collected

(4)

The SKPG’s
accountability
reports
(5)

The Governor

(6)

The Central
Government

Submits the reports to
the three parties

The
Provincial
Parliament
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This figure generated two questions. Which work units under the SKPG were
engaged in preparing the reports? and more specifically, who were individuals
knowledgeable about the reports?. The figure also guided me to locate which units under
the SKPG were involved in preparing accountability reports, as well as finding the potential
respondents within the relevant work units such as the Bureau of: Governance,
Organisation, the Provincial Internal Control Agency.15
The number of respondents are interviewed in this study are 15 including a member
of the provincial parliament (DPRD). Criteria employed in selecting the potential
respondents were (a) they were knowledgeable about local-government accountability
reporting; (b) they were willing to involve in this study voluntarily. The specific protocol
and guideline referred in conducting open-ended research question were (a) the actual
stream in case study interview is likely to be fluid rather than rigid, therefore risks,
discomforts, and inconveniences can be minimised; (b) the use of audiotape to record the
interview was subject to consent from the respondents.
In recruiting the potential respondents, I relied on my good rapport with them. I had
fostered good relationship with some potential respondents long before I did this study
through the sharing of thoughts and constructive discussion.
I commenced to select my potential respondents from an official in the Bureau of
Governance. I obtained much information from this contact (Mr. P1) about the practice of
local-government accountability reporting in the SKPG. Mr. P1 generously introduced me

15
In the interests of confidentiality, I will not publish names or detailed position descriptions of those people
who participated in interviews for this study.
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with some officials within the bureau such as Mr. P2, Mr. P3, Mr. P4 and Mr. P5, through
which I had an opportunity to approach them as my participants of this study. Afterwards,
they voluntarily provided me with valuable information that allowed me to map and extend
participants of this study in the Accounting Division. Mr. P6, an official in this division did
not mind to participate in this study.
Thanks to my daily activities within the SKPG office, it allowed to socialize with
officials there16. This situation allowed me to engage and discuss with more officials,
including Mr. P7, Mr. P8 and Mr. P12, information that I had obtained from these three
participants corroborate the findings gained from other participants.
From this bureau, I furthered my study in the Provincial Internal Control Agency to
understand some issues concerning the practice of public sector accounting and its control
mechanism. One official and two auditors (Mr. P13, Mr. P14 and Mr. P15) were willing to
provide me with some information needed.
Information gathered from the Provincial Internal Control Agency and the Bureau
of Governance led me to collect some information in the Bureau of Organisation
concerning the usefulness of local-government accountability reports and performance
measurement of local government practiced by the SKPG. On the basis of their work
experience, Mr. P9 and Mr. P10 were selected to be my respondents. When I asked them to
participate, they kindly agreed.

16

To support my activity in conducting research within the SKPG office, the relevant authority in the SKPG
provided me with a table and chair
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To enhance my understanding of the practice of local-government accountability
reporting in the SKPG, I also interviewed a member of the provincial parliament, Mr. P11.
A good relationship with this participant was gradually fostered. The process of participant
recruitment was subject to the ethical and information sheet approved by Human Research
Ethics Committee regarding: (a) that their involvement in this study was voluntary (b) that
they may withdraw their participation from this study at any time (c) refusal to participate
in the study will not affect your relationship with the University of Wollongong; and that
(d) confidentiality is assured, you will not be identified in any part of the research.
The interviews ranged from 10 to 30 minutes, subject to the consent and availability
of the respondents. Initially, I wished to use a digital recorder to record the interviews;
however, having learned that respondents in the SKPG office were reluctant to speak
openly if the interviews were recorded, I took notes instead. The decision not to record the
interviews is justified by the work of Hayes and Mattimoe (2004) and Moeran (2009).
Hayes and Mattimoe (2004, p.371), for instance, stated that:
At the start of a study, you may plan to tape all interviews. However, this predetermined strategy might have to be modified if tape-shy respondents appear in
your study cohort. As they are the providers of the information you seek, you must
be prepared to play the game their way, adapting your initial strategy accordingly.

Although most of the participants did not openly express their objection, I could
sense the reluctance and perceived it from their gestures. For instance, I once encountered
difficulty in getting data from Mr. C2, an official within the Bureau of Organisation since
the official had not known me previously. Mr. C2 said, "Each official here is subject to a
certain code of conduct to keep the secrecy of the organisation, including data given to
outsiders, unless it is used for good purposes".
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I dealt with this situation based on my knowledge of the local culture. Using, our
native language, Banjarese, I explained to the official that my research activities in the
SKPG office would be conducted in an ethical and responsible manner, and that his
involvement as respondent in this study was voluntary. Thus, he could decline to be
involved. Finally, our conversation flowed more cordially. This experience suggests that
having a shared culture with the respondents provides advantages, particularly in gaining
further information. This is in line with the work of Scapens (2004) who recommended that
the case-study researcher should have excellent language skills (including knowledge of the
local language) in communicating with both the subject of and the audience for the
research.
6.6.2. Direct Observations
Direct observations play an important role in providing additional information, as
well as shedding more light on the topic being studied (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997a). Direct
observations allowed me to have a deeper understanding of the practice of accountability
reporting in the SKPG.
Direct observation conducted should meet some criteria: (a) providing inputs that
allowed me to carry out a process of triangulation; and (b) offering insights about what
really happened during the course of local-government accountability reports preparation
and evaluation of the local-government accountability report held by the Provincial
Parliament.
The specific protocols employed during direct observation were: (a) securing
consent from the relevant authority of the event or meeting being observed; (b) acting to
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minimise the discomfort and inconvenience of my presence; (c) the use of audiotape to
record the interview was subject to consent from the relevant authorities and/or
respondents. The notes taken during the day were re-written in the evening in order to look
neat and organised so that I could reflect on them. The notes taken during site visit were
stored in my personal computer and my account at an off-site (cloud) computing provider.
This kind of source data allowed me to identify who were the real actors involved in
the preparation of accountability reports. For instance, according to a gubernatorial decree
(no. 188/44/36/KUM/2009), 21 people were assigned to prepare the accountability reports.
However, my direct observation in the field found that only four actors were engaged in
their preparation.
Thus, direct observations allowed me to compare what was written in the
gubernatorial decree and what was the reality. As another example, I attended the forum in
which the governor discharged accountability of his administration before the members of
the South Kalimantan Provincial Parliament; my direct observation allowed me to get the
“feel” of what was going on.
6.6.3. Documentation and Archival Records
Documentation and archival records strengthen research and provide information
that may not be available from other sources (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997a: McDonald, 2010;
Raptis, 2010). Yin (2003, p.87), for instance, noted that "the most important use of
documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources". Yin (2003, p.86)
further explains that documentation includes "administrative documents, formal studies or
evaluation, and newspaper clippings".
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In the field, I collected all these types of documentation, such as accountability
reports, accounting policies and some clippings from the leading newspapers (the
Banjarmasin Post and Radar Banjarmasin). To compare data obtained from the SKPG
office, I also gathered data from external sources such as the Audited Financial Statement
of the SKPG, the Supreme Audit Agency and the statistics of South Kalimantan Province
from the South Kalimantan chapter of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS Kalimantan
Selatan). The following table details the referenced documents.
Table 6.2. List of the Referenced Documents
No. Documents
1.
Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Daerah Provinsi
Kalimantan Selatan Tahun Anggaran 2005
2.
Hasil Pemeriksaan Semester II Tahun Anggaran (TA) 2007 atas
Pengendalian Kerusakan Pertambangan Umum Tahun 20032007
3.
Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan Atas Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah
Provinsi Kalimantan Tahun Anggaran 2008
4.
Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan Atas Sistem Pengendalian Intern
Dalam Kerangka Pemeriksaaan Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah
Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan Tahun Anggaran 2008
5.
Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan Atas Kepatuhan Terhadap
Perundang-Undangan Dalam Kerangka Pemeriksaan Laporan
Keuangan Pemerintah Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan Tahun
Anggaran 2008
6.
Ikhtisar Hasil Pemeriksaan Semester II Tahun 2008
7.
BPK RI Menunaikan Amanat Konstitusi
8.
Ikhtisar Hasil Pemeriksaan Semester II Tahun 2009
9.
Ikhtisar Hasil Pemeriksaan Semester II Tahun 2010
10. Ikhtisar Hasi Pemeriksaan Semester II Tahun 2011
11. Kalimantan Selatan Dalam Angka 2007
12. Kalimantan Selatan Dalam Angka 2009
13. LPPD Kalimantan Selatan 2008
14. LKPj Kalimantan Selatan 2008
15. ILPPD Kalimantan Selatan 2008
16. Rekomendasi DPRD Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan Terhadap
Laporan Peranggungjawaban (LKPj) Gubernur Kalimantan
Selatan

Year
2006

Source
BPK

2008a BPK

2009a BPK
2009b BPK

2009c BPK

2009d
2009e
2010
2011
2012
2007
2009
2009a
2009b
2009c
2009

BPK
BPK
BPK
BPK
BPK
BPS
BPS
SKPG
SKPG
SKPG
SKPP
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6.7. Data Analysis
The process of analysing data is a huge task because the data takes various forms,
such as observational notes, narratives, organisational reports and external reports
(Creswell, 1998). Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.50) portray this process as "messy,
ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating". Further, there is no single approach
to analysing data in qualitative research (Creswell, 1998; Dey, 2005; Lewis, 2007; Namey
et. al, 2007). This is because the method adopted is subject to influence form philosophical
stances (Abdul-Khalid, 2009), traditions, disciplines, methodologies, school of thought
(Lewis, 2007) and, the objective of research (Dey, 2005).
In the first stage, I found that the model proposed by Seidel (1998) provided
insights on how to engage with qualitative data analysis. Seidel (1998, p.1) described the
process of qualitative data analysis as a cyclic pattern of "noticing, collecting, and thinking
of interesting things". Seidel (1998, p.2) further highlighted that "[researchers] do not
simply notice, collect, and then think, and then write a report"; the process is iterative,
progressive, recursive (that is, allowing the researchers to identify requirements for
evidence as they are thinking) and holographic (that is, at each step the researcher is
simultaneously engaging in the others). The others, such as Leighton (2010), McLaren
(2010), Wiebe (2010), Bassett (2010) and Abdul-Khalid (2009), agree with Seidel (1988).
Furthermore, the process of iteration allows researchers to uncover further evidence
(Seidel, 1998; Bassett, 2010); this, in turn, allows the study to rely on multiple sources of
evidence, or triangulation (Tellis, 1997b). Neuman (2006, p.149) defined triangulation as
"the idea that looking at something from multiple point of view improves accuracy". Aaltio
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and Heilmann (2010) noted that the use of triangulation allows the researcher to compare
data collected from various sources, this increasing accuracy (Neuman, 2006, p.149),
reliability (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010, p.71), and offering more comprehensive knowledge
(Miller & Fox, 2004, p.36).
Further along, I considered the work of Marshall and Rossman (1999) to enrich and
complement the model suggested by Seidel (1998). Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.152)
put forward six general phases of data analysis: "(a) organising the data; (b) generating
categories, themes, and pattern; (c) coding the data; (d) testing the emergent understanding;
(e) searching for alternative explanations; and (f) writing the report". They further
explained that data reduction and interpretation occurs in each phase of this process. The
process demands that the researcher be dynamic and reflective in dealing with data
reduction and interpretive activities as well as directing the next step in the research. This is
in line with Lloyd-Jones (2003) and Frost et al. (2010), who argued that the role of a
qualitative researcher is significant in shaping and directing the research, and requires the
researcher to think reflectively to make sense of the object being studied. In this study, the
data was manually analysed using the model and procedures developed by Seidel (1998)
and Marshall and Rossman (1999). In the first stage, Seidel’s (1998) model guided me in
understanding how to gather data in qualitative research. In the further stages, analytic
procedures developed by Marshall and Rossman (1999) gave useful guidance in how to
reduce and interpret data.
Data reduction, as suggested by Marshall and Rossman (1999) encompasses three
procedures: organising the data; generating categories, themes and patterns; and coding the
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data, while the others three are employed for interpretation and writing activities (see Table
6.3)
Table 6.3. Application of the six phases of Marshall and Rossman (1999)
Activities

Phases

Actions taken
•

•

Data reduction

1.
2.

3.

Organising the data
Generating
categories, themes
and patterns
Coding the data
•

•

1.
Interpretation &
writing of the report

2.

3.

Testing the
emergent
understanding
Searching for
alternative
explanations
Writing the report

•

•

The detailed interviews were transcribed and
translated into English, and systematically
organised, together with observational notes and
relevant documents and archival records.
The organisation was based on the themes relevant
to this study’s objectives: 1) the process of
accountability-report
preparation;
2)
the
organisational culture of the SKPG; 3)
accountability reports as a socially-constructed
practice; 4) power and patronage; 5) decoupling; 6)
the contents of accountability reports; 7)
performance
measurement;
8)
institutional
isomorphism; 9) accountability forums; and 10)
provincial parliament's response to the report
submitted.
Interviews of respondents were coded by letter to
allow readers of this study easier in understanding
the flow of its discussion.
The data collected was analysed using a method
appropriate to the interpretive paradigm adopted for
this study. Lloyd-Jones (2003) and Lodico et al.
(2010) asserted that qualitative research is closely
related to inductive reasoning: "qualitative
researchers believe that full understanding of
phenomena is dependent on the context; they use
theories primarily after data collection to help them
interpret the patterns" (Lodico et al., 2011, p.11).
This view was also shared by Frankel and Devers
(2000) who noted that what the researcher has
understood from the previous stage of the research
significantly influences further stages of the
research process. Therefore, this study draws on
inductive reasoning in analysing the data collected.
In this study, emergent understanding was not
tested, as this study did not test hypothesis. Rather,
it was re-seen from other viewpoints (triangulation)
for gaining comprehensive knowledge as suggested
by Miller and Fox (2004).
Following the previous step, it allowed me for
searching alternative explanation for this study. For
instance, this study found that accountability forums
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•

held by the Provincial Parliament were largely
ritualistic, as they simply fulfilled the provisions
without having significant impact on performance
of the SKPG in delivering public services. Why did
it happen? A historical perspective was able to
provide me with more explanations as discussed in
Chapter 8.
There are four types of case-study writing formats,
to whom the reports are intended: (a) academic
colleagues; (b) policymakers; (c) special groups
such as dissertation or thesis committee; and (d)
funders of research (Yin, 2003). In writing the
report of this study, I followed regulations set by
the ethics committee of University of Wollongong.

6.8. Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to understand the practice of accountability
reporting within the SKPG. To accomplish this, the study’s philosophical foundations—
ontology, epistemology, methodology and method— should be well-comprehended and
established. This study is underpinned by a non-realist ontology that makes the assumption
that everything in the world is socially-constructed; thus the epistemological assumptions
of qualitative research are considered compatible with the study. These assumptions require
that the researcher should be as close as possible to the object to be studied. In this study,
such closeness enabled me to understand the practice of accountability reporting in South
Kalimantan Province; the true actors involved; and how relations among the actors
construct the practice of accountability reporting. Therefore, the interpretive paradigm is
applicable, since it allows me as the researcher to sense the richness of meaning as well as
the social context of the research setting.
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9.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the concluding remarks for this study investigating the
practice of accountability reporting in Indonesian local government in 2008. During 19671998, Indonesia was ruled by the Soeharto regime.

Within this era, the practice of

accountability reporting in local governments focused on being more accountable to the
regime (central government) than to the public. By this means, the regime controlled local
governments throughout the country.
The fall of the Soeharto regime in a people-power movement in 1998 has changed
the form of Indonesian government from a centralised to a decentralised government
system. At the macro level, the change from centralised to de-centralised government
systems affects the accountability system of local government; this, in turn, affects the
practice of local governments’ accountability reporting at the micro level. Within the
Soeharto regime, for instance, accountability reports were only submitted to the central
government and the local parliament. In contrast, in the post-Soeharto regime, the public is
now considered as one of the parties to whom accountability reports should be rendered,
along with the central government and the local parliament, as stipulated in Law No. 32
(2004) on Local Government.
The South Kalimantan Provincial Government (SKPG) was selected as the site for
this study. Given that the object of this study is a governmental organisation, Fogarty
(1996) suggests that institutional theory is a good lens for analysis, as it relates to inter214
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organisational activity characterised by the attempt to secure social legitimacy through
conformity to the prevailing values for appropriate behaviour, in which governmental
agencies are usually charecterised as "highly regulated organisations" that rely on public
financing (Fogarty, 1996, p.246).
This rest of this chapter is organised into three sections: the findings of the study
(section 9.2); limitations of the study (section 9.3); and potential further research (section
9.4).

9.2. The Findings of the Study
In an attempt to meet the objectives set forth in Chapter 1, this study poses two
research questions. First, how and why does local government prepare its annual
accountability reports?; and second, how does the local parliament evaluate the annual
accountability report submitted by the local executive? It is apparent that both research
questions posed in this study use “how” and “why” questions. According to Yin (2003,
p.21), "the case study strategy is most likely to be appropriate for ‘how’ and ‘why’
questions”. Thus, this study has employed a case-study strategy.
Concerning the first question, How and why does local government prepare its
annual accountability reports?, this study presents some empirical findings.
The issuance of two provisions— Law No. 32 (2004) on Local Government and
Government Regulation (GR) No. 3 (2007) on Accountability Reporting of Local
Government— has started to regard citizens as a new and appropriate audience for the
report; this had not been the case during the Soeharto regime (1967-1998). Thus, local
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governments’ accountability reports are submitted to three parties: the central government,
the relevant provincial parliament and the public. However, among these three parties, the
public receives the least information, as the accountability report promulgated to the
citizens is only a summary of that submitted to the central government as stipulated in
article 27 (3) of GR No. 3 (2007). It is apparent that the SKPG complies with such
provisions. It could be said, therefore, that GR No. 3 (2007) contains a flawed conception
because it does not compel local government to be more transparent to citizens or to
guarantee the right of citizens to be well-informed by their local government.
This study found that the SKPG cannot seem to free itself from "classic" bad
practices usually attributed to Indonesian public-sector workers, such as unpunctuality,
inefficient and ineffective work practices and recklessness in managing data, as discussed
in Chapter Seven. The persistence of these poor practices appears to cause the SKPG to
experience low institutional capacity in performing its task. This is consistent with studies
conducted by Imbarrudin (2004) and the Democratic Reform Support Program (DRSP,
2009) that assert that Indonesian local governments have had limited institutional capacity
in carrying out their duties. The phenomenon of low institutional capacity is often found in
developing countries, as reported Graham (2002) and Smoke (2005).
The low institutional capacity suffered by the SKPG might be only a reflection of
the dysfunctional organisational culture adopted. Although the three elements of
organisational culture— artefacts, espoused values and basic assumptions— exist, they are
not practised integrally. As a result, each element runs separately without clear direction.
Schein’s (2004) model offers an explanation concerning the level of culture practised by an
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organisation. Given this model, it is apparent that the culture practised by the SKPG is still
in the level of artefact, such as slogans, jargon or motto embedded in the emblem of the
SKPG. Likewise, the SKPG’s espoused values and basic assumptions are not practised in
day-to-day operations. As a result, the actual behaviour of SKPG members has not reflected
the organisation’s core beliefs (basic assumptions) and espoused values.
It is evident from this study that the SKPG's accountability reports are prepared
through routine activities. Routine, referring to the work of Scapens (1994, p. 306), are
made possible by “social coherence upon human activity, partly through the continuing
production and reproduction of habits of thought and action”. It could be said, therefore,
that accountability reporting as practised by the SKPG is a socially-constructed reality.
Because individuals involved in the preparation of accountability reports bring their
respective habits to their work (Hallet, 2003), over time these individual habits transform
into organisational routine (Scapens, 1994) through interaction— largely constructed via
social relationships rather than formal processes— among the organisation’s members
(Fine, 1984).
The practice of decoupling exists within the SKPG. This means that there is a
deviation between what organisations actually do compared to what their own
organisational structure suggests they should do (Fogarty, 1992). As a result, the SKPG
neglects the principles of efficiency and effectiveness, as suggested by Meyer and Rowan
(1977) Zucker (1987) and Mouritsen, (1994). The SKPG operates within a relatively
highly institutionalised environment, in which good leaders are perceived to be those who
presents themselves as what Irvine (2011) calls “the institutional conformist”, participating
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in and preserving the prevailing institutions, such as religious and traditional rites, and
becoming involved in charity programs.
It is apparent that the accountability reports prepared by the SKPG are relatively
descriptive and do not disclose some key information such as internal control, risk
management, remuneration of executives and members of the provincial parliament, spatial
planning and sustainable environmental development (discussed in Chapter Seven). This
then affects the usefulness of the reports , as they lack important information that could
support the work units within the SKPG in their duties and tasks.
The inclusion of performance measurement as part of local governments’
accountability reports as stipulated in GR No. 6 (2008) has not enhanced the function of the
reports as a medium of discharging accountability to its stakeholders, as the performance
measurement information is only available in the accountability report for central
government (LPPD), not in the accountability reports for the provincial parliament (LKPj)
or the public (ILLPPD).
Among the three possible versions of institutional isomorphism practised by
SKPG— coercive, mimetic and normative— it is evident that the SKPG is most susceptible
to coercive isomorphism. In preparing accountability reports, for instance, SKPG fully
complied with the provisions set by the central government, because the source of the
SKPG’s budget is primarily the central government. This is consistent with the work of
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who noted that dependent organisations tend to conform to
superior ones to get resources. At the same time, mimetic and particularly normative
isomorphism are also present, but in a symbolic way.
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With regard to the second research question, How does local parliament evaluate
the annual accountability report submitted by local government in the accountability
forum?, this study found some interesting developments.
Law No. 32 (2004) and GR No. 3 (2007) require local parliaments to hold an annual
accountability forum. Theoretically, the accountability forum is a forum in which the
power-holder is obliged to explain and justify his or her conduct, a question-and-answer
session is scheduled, and recommendations resulting from the forum have the potential to
trigger the imposition of sanctions on the power-holder, as suggested by theorists such as
Bovens (2007a, 2007b, 2010) and Mulgan (2000a). In fact, in 2008 the SKPG’s governor
merely delivered his speech on that year’s accountability report, then handed the report
over to the chairperson of the parliament, after which the accountability forum was
officially closed. There was no question-and-answer session.
A month after the first forum, the South Kalimantan Provincial Parliament held a
second accountability forum, wherein a response to the accountability report submitted by
the SKPG was to be given. However, the South Kalimantan Provincial Parliament simply
complied with GR No. 3 (2007), which stipulates only one agenda item for the forum:
delivering its recommendations on the SKPG’s accountability report. The provincial
parliament’s six-page set of recommendations was delivered by one of the members of
parliament, after which the second forum was officially closed, completing all
accountability arrangements for the 2008 SKPG accountability report. Again, there was no
question-and-answer session, let alone “a rational and encouraging sanction” by the
parliament on the SKPG to encourage better performance.
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The provincial parliament raised no critical assessment in its recommendation. The
lack of capacity to perform was acknowledged by the parliament, as stated in page 2 of its
recommendations, where it blamed the insufficient time available (one month) to assess the
report properly and the limited data the report presented. The provincial parliament’s lack
of capacity to assess the accountability report might be caused by the reluctance of the
members of parliament to engage in something so "complicated"; this is evidenced by the
absence of any assessment standard or benchmarks for the accountability report; in other
words, there was no clear framework on how to assess it.
Apart from the absence of a framework for assessing or controlling the executive,
the provincial parliament, regrettably, also does not have a standard of assessment for its
own annual programs. It seems from the results of this study, therefore, that the provincial
parliament takes neither its role of controlling the executive (SKPG) nor its responsibility
to assess its own programs seriously. As a result, the parliament tends to perpetuate
“archaic" programs such as the comparative-study visit program (studi banding), which
have been common since the Soeharto era and, seem to place limited values on raising the
quality of reporting.
The absence of a question-and-answer session within the accountability forums and
the provincial parliament’s lack of authority to impose sanctions on the executive could be
contextualised from a regulatory perspective. Following the collapse of the Soeharto
regime, the Habibie administration attempted to address popular demand by endorsing
reform-spirited provisions, including Law No. 22 (1999) on Local Government. One of the
key features of this law was to give local parliament the authority to impose sanctions on
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local government in the accountability forum. However, the issuance of Law No. 32 (2004)
on Local Government, passed by the Megawati administration, annulled the previous
legislation. This annulment was most likely driven by members of local parliaments’ use of
their authority to pressure local government with the prospect of impeachment for the sake
of their own interests, as happened in some regions during 2001-2002 (Chapter Eight).

9.3. Limitations of the Study
Apart from the significance and contribution of this study, I should acknowledge
several limitations contained by it.
This study took place in the context of one province out of 33 provinces in
Indonesia. This means that the results and findings cannot necessarily be generalised as
representative of the condition of local governments in Indonesia as a whole, because each
province has its own characteristics, culture and environmental setting.
The provisions referred to by this study may have changed or become obsolete
following the issuance of new provisions by the Indonesian government after the datacollection period was conducted.
There are linguistic/translation issues with any cross-language study. This may
affect the way meaning is translated from the local language (Banjarese) into English.
Thus, some inaccuracies might be reflected in my interviews.
As a budding researcher, my own beliefs and background affect the way I interpret
the interview data. To cope with this issue, I used the triangulation method to minimise the
potential for misinterpretation where possible. Specifically, I used some sources from
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external and independent agencies such as the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS), non-governmental organisation and mass media.

9.4. Potential Further Research
This study identifies at least two potential areas for further research. First, there is a
tendency for some businesspeople in South Kalimantan Province to engage in local
political affairs. The expanding role of local businesspeople into the political realm might
be driven by business motives (that is, they seek to protect their business interests,
particularly natural resources such as coal deposits). If local legislative bodies at both the
provincial and district levels are controlled by businesspeople, it is most likely that policies
agreed to by the executive and the legislative will be nothing more than the result of "horsetrading” among their respective interests. Therefore, investigating the way policy on
economic resources will be directed and controlled is an intriguing question. Second, given
the fact that South Kalimantan Province is an institutionalised environment with particular
beliefs and traditions, an ethnographic study into the role of written reports in an oral-based
society could be interesting.
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Appendix 2: Development of Modern Organisational Institutionalism
Periods
1977-1983
(Foundations)

Key Studies
Meyer & Rowan (1977),
Zucker (1977), Meyer &
Rowan (1983), DiMaggio &
Powell (1983), Tolbert &
Zucker (1983) and Meyer &
Scott (1983)

1983-1991
(Early years)

Astley & Van de Ven
(1983), Fligstein (1985),
Galaskiewicz
(1985),
Brunson (1985, 1989), Scott
(1991).

1991-2007
(Expanding horizons)

Scott (1995) Daft (1997),
Aldrich (1999), Westphal &
Zajac
(2001),
Elsbach
(1994), Arndt & Bigelow
(2000), Denrell (2003),
Dacin, Goldstein & Scott
(2002), Thorton (2004).

Features of the Studies
These works focused on the
interplay between
organisations and their
environments and
investigated how
organisations coped with
social structures
(institutions) for securing
their societal legitimacy.
The works of scholars
showed various approaches
in investigating organisation
in
relation
to
the
institutional context such as:
processual, cross-category,
cross-national and means of
transmission.
During this period, studies
on modern organisational
institutionalism cover some
issues: institutional
isomorphism, legitimacy,
institutional
entrepreneurship and
change, and institutional
logics.

Source: Greenwood et al. (2008), pp. 1-46
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Appendix 3: Data Collection Process
Activities
Locating site/individual

Characteristic
A bound “case,” such as a
process, activity, event,
program, or multiple
individuals, is investigated.
Gaining Access and making A
gatekeeper
provides
rapport
access to information and
assistance
in
gaining
confidence of participants.

Data Collection Question
What is studied?
(Define the case.)

Purposefully sampling

What sites or individuals are
going to be studied?
(Sample with purpose.)

Collecting data

Record information

Resolving field issues

Storing data

A “case” or “cases,” an
“atypical” case, or a
“maximum variation” or
“extreme” case is defined.
A collection of forms, such
as documents and records,
interviews, observations, or
physical
artifacts,
is
compiled.
A variety of approaches
(e.g., field notes, interviews,
and observations) are used to
gather data.
Concerns
may
emerge
related to intensive data
gathering.
A large amount of data (e.g.,
field notes, transcriptions,
computer databases) is
typically collected.

What are any concerns
related to access and
rapport?
(Establish
access
and
rapport.)

What type(s) of information
will be collected?
(Delimit data.)

How
is
information
compiled?
(Record information).
Is data collection difficult?
(Address field issues.)
How is information stored?
(Store data for analysis.)

Source: Creswell (1998, p. 110) and Hancock & Algozzine (2006, p.23)
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